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ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI

F R O M S O V E R E I G N T Y T O P R O C E S S:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
FEDERALISM AFTER GARCIA

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 19, 1985, the Supreme Court, in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,1 overruled its 1976 decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery. 2 Although the continued vitality
of National League of Cities had been in question in recent years, 3 the
Court's abrupt repudiation of the very principle announced in that
case4 is an event of considerable significance, beyond showing, one
more time, that the rule of stare decisis has a limited application in
the Court's modern constitutional adjudication. 5 Garcia's imporAndrzej Rapaczynski is Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University.
ALTH0R's NOTE: I wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues, Professors Henry
Monaghan, Peter Strauss, Alan Farnsworth, and Alfred Hill for their comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. I owe a special debt to Professor Bruce Ackerman for encouraging
me to write this article and for his insightful comments at all stages of the writing process.
105 S.Ct 1005 (1985).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3 None of the Supreme Court decisions in the post-1976 period in which the question of
state immunity from federal interference was raised was favorable to the state interest. Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S.
742 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983).
4 At one or another point between 1976 and 1985 all nine Justices declared their overt
adherence to the National League of Cities decision. See the cases cited in the preceding note.
5 National League of Cities itself had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
1

2

© 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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tance lies, above all, in revealing the absence of anything approaching a well elaborated theory of federalism that would provide a
solid intellectual framework for an articulation of the Justices' divergent views on state-national relations. Three dissenting members of the Garcia Court state in no uncertain terms that they are
prepared to reverse the course again in the near future. 6 It is very
important, therefore, for the scholarly community and the profession to conduct a thorough inquiry into the theoretical foundations
of federalism before the Court embarks on further adventures.
The position of federalism in our constitutional law is peculiar.
On the one hand, next to separation of powers and individual
rights, federalism is clearly one of the three main branches of our
constitutional structure. On the other hand, judicial enforcement of
any limits on national power that the concept of federalism might
entail has a rather unfortunate history and, at least insofar as the
limitations on national commerce power are concerned, seems to
have been abandoned in the Garcia case in favor of what Professor
Wechsler has called "the political safeguards of federalism. " 7
More than in any other area of constitutional adjudication, the
Court's attempts to impose federalism-related limitations on the
national government have been, throughout history, frustrated by
the political process, resulting three times in constitutional amendments. The Court's decision in the Dred Scott case 8 that slavery was
a municipal institution outside federal control, was "overruled" by
the Civil War Amendments. The decision in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co. 9 that "the boundary between the Nation and the
States ... would have disappeared" 10 if the national taxing power
had been extended to taxing income from real estate, led to the
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court's attempts to

6 Garcia v. San Antonio MT A, 105 S.Ct. at 1033 (Justice Rehnquist dissenting) and 105
S.Ct. at 1038 (Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist join,
dissenting).
7 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). Garcia v.
San Antonio MTA, 105 S.Ct. 1018 ("the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure
the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself").
8

19 How. 393 (1857).

9

157 U.S. 429 (1895).

10

157 U.S. at 583.
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give meaning to the Tenth Amendment by limiting national regulation of private activities under the Commerce Clause 11 were instrumental in precipitating the "constitutional crisis" of 1937 and led to
a wholesale judicial retreat. 12 As recently as 1970, the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 13 holding that Congress lacked the power
to enfranchise eighteen-year-olds in state elections, resulted in passing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which it took the country only
three months to ratify.
It is important to inquire into the reasons for this rather dismal
record of judicial intervention. 14 The most common explanation,
seemingly adopted by the Garcia Court, is that federalism is essentially a political arrangement and that the policing of it is, for one
reason or another, unsuited to the modus operandi of the judicial
department. 15 The extreme version of this argument is exemplified
by Professor Choper's claim that the Court is most needed and
most effective in protecting individual rights against governmental
encroachments and that its reservoir of legitimacy is only dissipated
if the Court intervenes in the distribution of institutional competences among governmental entities. 16 Whatever merit this view
may have, it is clearly not shared by the Court, which has not shied
away from highly charged, controversial issues of institutional
competence in the area of separation of powers, most recently in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. 17 Instead, the
Court's reasoning in Garcia singles out the federalism-related limita-

11

Art. I, Section 8, of the Constitution. See cases listed in notes 38, 43 infra.

12

See cases listed in note 45 infra.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).

13

According to Professor Choper, "there is virtually no states' rights decision of any note
that retains current meaningful force." Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process 170 (1980). The exception made by Choper in 1980 for the National League of Cities
case, ibid., is no longer necessary.
14

15 While stressing the "political safeguards of federalism," the Court's opinion in the Garcia
case stops short of declaring outright that federalism-related limits on the national commerce
power present a nonjustifiable political question(" ... we need to go no further than to state
that we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as
applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional
provision." 105 S.Ct at 1020). Indeed, I shall argue later in this article that Garcia should be
understood as calling for a new jurisprudence of federalism.
16 Choper, note 14 supra. For a critique of Choper's views on federalism, see Nagel,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Supreme
Court Review 81.
17 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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tions on the national power as peculiarly unsuitable for judicial
resolution. We are not really told, however, what distinguishes
federalism from the separation of powers in this respect: it is certainly not the absence of the "political safeguards" of the latter, for
the Constitution abounds in provisions guaranteeing that at least
the Congress and the President have ample means to protect themselves in the political arena. More likely, the reason for singling out
federalism is to be found in the absence from the Constitution of
any affirmative state-rights limitations on the scope of national
powers, beyond those that specify the role of the states in functioning of the federal institutions.
But is unlikely that this reason could be genuinely decisive. To
begin with, many, if not most, hard cases in the area of separation
of powers do not deal with any straightforward violation of affirmative constitutional limitations. 18 From the very beginning, the
Court's most important decisions have often proceeded from what
came to be called the "structure" of the Constitution. 19 It is not
unreasonable to state that all constitutional interpretation, even
when a specific affirmative provision is at issue, requires a background understanding of the general institutional framework of
governmental bodies and an appreciation of the context within
which they operate. In this connection, the centrality of the concept of federalism within the structure established by the Constitution does not admit of serious question. In setting up the national
government, the Framers worked against the background of already existing state institutions, and, unlike in the case of the federal authorities established by the Constitution, they were not conferring any new powers on the states. While they undoubtedly
18 The one-House veto, for example, is nowhere explicitly prohibited in the Constitution,
and such a prohibition cannot be inferred from the bicameralism and Presidential veto
provisions without assuming the doctrine of nondelegation which is nowhere to be found in
the Constitution. INS v. Chadha, ibid. See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Presidential removal power, at issue in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 259 U.S. 602 (1935), and
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), is not subject to any explicit Constitutional
provision. The Congressional power over Presidential papers, Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425 (1977), as well as the matter of executive privilege,
United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 638 (1974), are equally unmentioned. Indeed,
judicial review, Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803), is not governed hy any explicit
provision.
19 See Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). For an example of a
structural approach to the separation of powers questions and the relation between this
approach and the textual analysis of the Constitution, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
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chose broad language in describing the competence of the national
government, their assumption of the continued existence and vitality of state governments is visible throughout the Constitution.
Thus, the absence of affirmative limitations on the national power,
especially in the light of the enumeration technique in Article I,
Section 8, cannot be viewed as preclusive of a judicial enforcement
of the principles related to the federal structure of our government.
The most plausible explanation of the repeated frustration of
judicial intervention in the area of state-national relations is the
failure of judges and scholars to produce a viable theory of federalism that would help to develop workable principles for the judicial
resolution of federalism-related disputes. To begin with, rather
than focusing on a functional analysis of the role of the states in the
federal system-an analysis that would parallel the Court's jurisprudence in the area of separation of powers-the basic intellectual
inquiry has been concentrated on the concept of state sovereignty
and its implications for the limitation of national authority. Furthermore, it was in the light of the idea of state sovereignty that the
constitutional doctrine of the enumeration of federal powers was
interpreted, which led to the conclusion that the enumeration implied some reserved area of exclusive state control. Despite the fact
that this view of the intergovernmental division of competences had
always created some tensions, 20 as long as the actual exercise of the
federal commerce power was relatively restricted, the inadequacy
of the concept of sovereignty for analyzing the role of the states in
the federal system was not immediately apparent. Nevertheless,
even after the massive shift toward national regulation of economic
and social life has revealed that the enumeration doctrine provided
no viable standards for the protection of the states, the constitutional defense of state rights has continued to rely on the concept of
state sovereignty. No serious attempt has been made to go beyond
the few standard shibboleths associated with this way of thinking.
It is also possible that a political disinclination toward the staterights doctrine, stemming from the Civil War divisions and the
intellectual ascendancy of the New Deal, further contributed to the
neglect of a theory of federalism. But the past failures should not be
taken to preclude the possibility of future success. Indeed, even if
the protection of the federal structure of the United States is to rest
ultimately with the political process, and not the courts, the actors
20

See Frankfurter, Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney, and Waite (1937).
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in that process, no less than judges, must have some idea of the
basic purposes of federalism and the reasons behind their constitutional protection. A new theory of federalism is thus necessary to
allow us a more comprehensive understanding of the American
institutions. In the following pages I shall attempt to clear the
ground for such a theory of federalism and point in the directions in
which I think it should develop.

II.

FEDERALISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY:
A CRITIQUE

The rhetoric of state sovereignty is responsible for much of
the intellectual poverty of our federalism-related jurisprudence. No
assignment of meanings to the words of a language is sacred, and
words can be made to serve different purposes. It is thus possible,
of course, to preserve the use of the word "sovereignty" in speaking
of American federalism by making it stand for the precise assortment of characteristics possessed by the states in our constitutional
system. But the price for doing so is quite high, for the word carries
with it an array of traditional meanings, and I will try to show that
none of these meanings make much sense when used in the American context. Thus, while the use of the word "sovereign" with
respect to the states may have carried a welcome implication of
some dignity attributable to state governmental institutions (and I
doubt that much more by way of a clear meaning could be assigned
to its use in the conventional legal discourse of federalism outside
the area of state sovereign immunity 21 ), the confusion resulting
from this usage far outweighs any of its advantages and the \\'Ord
should be abandoned.
Even in political philosophy, where the term originated, "sovereignty" does not have any clear, undisputed meaning. In most of its
classical formulations, however, it was used to identify the peculiar
kind of authority that only a state could possess. The concept, as
originally introduced by Bodin, 22 was designed to strengthen the
hand of the French king in his struggle against the nobility and to

21 The state's sovereign immunity is, by and large, irrelevant to the problems of federalism
since the states are not immune to suits bv the United States or bv other states. Monaco v.
·
,
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).

22

Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale (McRae ed.) (1962).
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assert the necessity, as well as the legitimacy, of a single source of
authority in the political realm. Bodin himself did not deny that the
sovereign was constrained by the higher principles of natural law
and the divine commandments, and he understood the concept of
sovereignty as pertaining to the King's ultimate and exclusive authority to lay down the principles of positive law. Nevertheless,
within a legal or institutional context, the concept was designed to
deny the legitimacy of any opposition to royal authority. It is this
feature of the concept of sovereignty that made it attractive to legal
positivists for whom it provided a seemingly sound basis for explaining the binding force of legal norms. From Hobbes to Austin, 23 the idea of sovereignty came to stand for an ultimate source of
authority, capable of enacting laws binding on everyone else, but
not itself bound by any laws and capable of changing them at will.
The precise status of the theory of sovereignty has never been
entirely clear. It could be understood as a descriptive theory claiming that in every actual political society there exists de facto an
ultimate source of authority, legal or political, and that the task of a
political scientist is to identify it. But it could also be understood as
a normative theory claiming that in each political society there
ought to be such an authority, for otherwise instability or illegitimacy would ensue. And finally, the theory could be understood as
axiomatic, simply spelling out a condition that must necessarily be
satisfied for a society to be recognized as "political" or as forming a
"state." But what constitutes the common core of the theory is the
claim that only a state could be sovereign, so that the term is not
applicable to individuals or institutions of another kind. To be sure,
sovereignty implies such things as "autonomy," "dignity," "freedom," "power," "authority," and so on. But if the term does not
simply duplicate one or more of these things, it means something
more than that, and this "something more" only a state can possess.
There are essentially three components defining the differentia
speciftca of sovereignty: (1) A sovereign must be sovereign (have
authority) over someone and something (that is, there must be
subjects and a domain over which the sovereign rules); (2) the authority of a sovereign over the subjects within the sovereign's domain must be of a political nature (that is, at a minimum, the types
23 Hobbes, Leviathan (Macpherson ed.) (1968); Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined (Hart ed.), esp. at 193ff. (1954).
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of commands issued by the sovereign must be capable of acquiring
a legal status and be backed by an appropriate enforcement mechanism);24 and (3) the authority of a sovereign must be final (that is,
the sovereign cannot in turn be dependent on another person or
institution, and there is no further recourse for subjects who are not
prepared to obey the sovereign's commands).
It follows immediately from these postulates that it is impossible
to be a sovereign and a subject at the same time, at least with
respect to the same command. For if the subject must obey the
sovereign, while the sovereign is always free to change his mind,
then it cannot be said, in a literal sense, that one is both the subject
and the sovereign or that one is a sovereign over oneself. 25
The power of the theory of sovereignty is considerable. If one
accepts it, the mere location of the sovereign in a given community
allows one to deduce some very important attributes of the person
or institution in question. Thus, for example, if the English courts
are persuaded that Parliament is the British sovereign, then it immediately follows that, like the most absolute of monarchs, it "can
do no wrong," that is, it must be treated as a source of all legal
norms and never a subject of any of them. 26 If it does not permit
suits against itself, no one can challenge its decrees. If it tramples
on even the most cherished British traditions, it may perhaps cause
a revolution, but nothing short of that will release the courts from
their duty to enforce its commands.
Simply to state the proposition that the American states are sovereign in this sense is to refute it. The problem is not so much that
the states have written constitutions that limit the powers of their

24 The requirement that the sovereign's commands must be able to acquire a legal status
may appear circular if the concept of sovereignty is then used to explain the binding force of
legal commands. But there is more to law than merely its binding force, such as, for example,
the general character of its commands or a standard mode of enforcement.
25 This poses some problems for the idea of popular sovereignty. They can perhaps be
overcome by distinguishing the people as a collective body from private individuals and such
must be the sense of Rousseau's distinction between the general will (volonte generate) and the
wills of particular individuals, even when the particular wills perfectly coincide (the will of
all or volonte des tous). Similarly, the Kantian idea of autonomous sovereign individuality
presupposes a distinction between the agent as a purely rational will and as an empirical
consciousness driven by inclinations. Even so, Austin believed that all such uses of the term
"sovereignty" were at best metaphorical. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined

255 (1954).
26 In practice a legal fiction is maintained that it is the "King in Parliament" that is the
British sovereign, but nothing hinges on this here. Cf Austin, note 23 supra, at 230-33.
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governments, for one may perhaps look to the bodies that can
change these constitutions as the true sovereigns and view the state
governments as their delegates or representatives. The problem
rather is that the federal Constitution imposes a variety of limits on
the states that are clearly incompatible with the absolute authority
entailed by state sovereignty in this strong sense. 27
The reason why this obvious fact does not by itself preclude
viewing the American states as sovereign in some weaker sense is
that, even for the most ardent positivist, the concept of a sovereign
cannot refer exclusively to a divinelike entity that has an absolute
power over everyone and everything everywhere. The least problematic case of sovereignty is that of an independent state viewed
from outside, in the domain of foreign relations, where the domestic division of authority is largely ignored and the person representing the state is viewed as empowered to speak without any
limitation for the country as a whole. Clearly, even in this case, to
say that a state is sovereign is an abbreviated way of saying that its
sovereignty is limited to some domain. This domain is defined
geographically by the territory of the country, and the state's authority is restricted to power over the state's own citizens or those
citizens of other countries who are within its territory. 28 Whether
we view these limitations of sovereignty as a matter of power alone,
or of some voluntary agreement on the part of the sovereign, or of
some higher law (the law of nations or of nature) does not seem to

27 The Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, Section 2, not only assures the supremacy of federal
over state laws but also forces state judges to apply federal law in appropriate cases. Art. IV,
Section l obliges state courts to give full faith and credit to public records and judicial
proceedings in other states as a matter of duty and not of comity. Art. IV, Section 2 limits
the power of the states to give preference to their own residents and thus takes away much of
their power to determine their citizenship. Art. IV, Section 3 limits the power of the states to
control their geographical boundaries. Art. IV, Section 4 limits the states' right to choose
their own form of government by obligating the United States to assure that each state
government is "republican." Art. I, Section 10 prohibits the states to conduct foreign policy
(including entering into compacts or agreements with other states and engaging in war), to
conduct an independent monetary policy, impose export duties, impair obligations of contract, grant titles of nobility, pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. Judicial decisions
subordinated state courts to federal review. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, l Wheat. 304 (1816);
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). Art. 3, Section 2 has been interpreted to imply no
sovereign immunity for the states in suits by other states or the United States. Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
28 There is also in some cases more questionable jurisdiction over foreigners abroad or on
the high seas, see Leech, Oliver, & Sweeny, Cases and Materials on the International Legal
System, Part I (1973), but these complications need not detain us.
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destroy the usefulness of the concept in international relations. 29
One way or another, the existence of many states implies a division
of sovereignty (or at least of sovereigns), while at the same time the
dominion of each state within its boundaries may still be seen as in
principle absolute.
The use of the concept of sovereignty in analyzing the relation
between the states and the federal government most likely derives
from an analogy to this least problematic case of international relations. If sovereignty may be parceled out among various nations,
the argument seems to run, why couldn't it be parceled out somewhat differently in the case of the United States. At this point, a
story is usually told that runs something like this: After the separation of the colonies from Great Britain, the American states became
independent and sovereign within their boundaries. The Articles of
Confederation were essentially akin to an international compact
since their efficacy depended on the voluntary cooperation of the
states. The Constitution of 1789 changed this situation in important respects because it allowed the federal government to operate
directly on the people in the states and imposed binding restrictions
on state power. Still-the story continues-the powers of the federal government are not general but limited to those enumerated in
the Constitution. Since that leaves a residuum of powers not delegated, the states, which have existed continuously throughout this
period, have remained sovereign, although their sovereignty has
become limited to the residuum of the powers not delegated to the
United States. Thus, it might be argued, even if the sovereignty
was parceled out between the states and the federal government in a
way that is different from its division among the many nation
states, the remaining areas of state and federal competence are
nevertheless partially exclusive, and this exclusiveness allows for an
absolute (sovereign) authority of each government in its own
sphere.
Put in this way, the idea of state sovereignty is not self-refuting.
To be sure, a positivist purist would immediately point out that
any limitation of a sovereign nation's power in international relations is due exclusively to the sovereign's own voluntary agreement-the idea of international law being, for such a positivist,
29 The case becomes more problematic if some international body has the authority to
enforce the norms of international law.

8]

FEDERALISM

351

incompatible with national sovereignty-while the limitations of
the American states' power comes from the federal Constitution
over which the states have only a very limited authority. But we
need not be detained by this objection, for so long as some domain
of exclusive state power can be meaningfully identified, even if a
state is not itself free to change it, the idea of state sovereignty does
not lose all its utility. The real problem is that even a moderately
searching scrutiny of the powers of the federal government shows
that the alleged existence of a residual category of exclusive state
powers over any private, nongovernmental activity is in fact illusory. This does not mean, of course, that the idea of federalism,
with its notion of independent state governments, is also illusory. It
may very well be, for example, that state governments are not
merely local branches of the United States government anymore
than the League of Women Voters is such a branch and that state
governments enjoy a panoply of immunities by virtue of the principles of federalism. But the idea of sovereignty implies at a
minimum that the sovereign must be the ultimate source of legal
authority over someone other than himself, so that not every immunity which allows for some person or institution to have his or
its own sphere of autonomy amounts to carving out a new sovereign
domain. 30 It is not surprising, therefore, that the history of the
American idea of state sovereignty turns out, on closer inspection,
to be the story of a succession of vain attempts to define some
substantive domain over which exclusive and ultimate state authority could be confidently asserted.
A simple comparison with nation states reveals that the American states lack a domain defined in precisely those terms that make
the notion of national sovereignty relatively unproblematic. The
domain in which national governments are sovereign can be easily
delimited by their geographical boundaries. The case of the American states is different because, although state jurisdictions are geographically determined, their sovereignty over their territory is
vitiated by the geographically coextensive reach of the federal gov30 It is only if the concept of autonomy (self-determination) is thoroughly confused with
the cow;ept of sovereignty (control over others) that one can still maintain that the American
states are "sovereign." While it is, of course, impossible to forbid anyone to use the word in
this way, doing this will also entail calling individuals, private associations, and single
branches of the federal government "sovereign," for they also have their own spheres of
autonomy within our constitutional order.
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ernment. Neither can the sovereign domain of the American states
be defined in terms of their authority over their people, for it is the
same people who are also subject to the jurisdiction of the federal
government. Faced with this, the attempts to carve out a sphere of
exclusive state authority have traditionally proceeded to define it in
terms of some substantive fields of regulation, such as production
versus commerce, social versus economic regulation, local versus
interstate commerce, and so forth. 31 It is, of course, not a priori
impossible to make such distinctions. By a peculiar hypertrophy of
logic over reality, one may separate commerce from production, for
example, by a set of rigid definitions and enforce such distinctions
regardless of practical consequences. It is scarcely worth considering such an alternative, however, for it would be a prime example
of putting the cart before horse: instead of thinking of state sovereignty as a way of ensuring the viability of federalism, this approach can only explode the concept of federalism to save the
fiction of state sovereignty.
A defensible use of the concept of state sovereignty presupposes
that the domain over which a state exercises supreme authority
corresponds to some reality, that is, that the areas cordoned off
from federal interference have some practical separateness from the
point of view of the purposes of good government. The reason why
the idea of sovereignty retains some significance in the area of
international relations does not lie in pure philosophy but precisely
in the fact that most actual states constitute relatively viable social,
economic, and cultural units. People united by a long-standing
tradition, speaking a distinctive common language, living within
boundaries that roughly correspond to the relevant economic market, can be grouped into a political unit that exercises ultimate
authority over all the matters that concern them. When these independently unifying factors are missing, such as in the case of some
states created by artificial colonial lines, or in the case of artificially
small states, 32 or in the case of countries tied to their neighbors by
increasing economic, social, and cultural interdependence, even the
traditional concept of geographically defined sovereignty becomes
an increasingly artificial construct, reversing the natural order of

31

32

See notes 38-44 infra and accompanying text.
The free city of Danzig in the period 1920-39 comes to mind here.
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dependence between the needs to be served by political authority
and purely political organization. In such situations, politics begins
to exert an entirely autonomous influence over social and economic
life to the detriment of unhampered development. In some (rather
fortunate) cases, the political organization collapses under the
weight of its own irrelevance and new, more viable units are
formed. In other cases, politics comes out victorious over reality,
but only at the cost of repression and the ultimate stifling of the
vitality of those who have the misfortune to be the subjects of the
artificial sovereign. In only rare cases can a viable socio-economicocultural unit be created by purely political means. 33 In the area of
international relations, where the concept of sovereignty constitutes one of the few barriers against anarchy and constant interference of some states in the "internal affairs" of other countries, the
emergence of an artificial and unviable sovereign may nevertheless
dictate a restraint on the behavior of other members of the international community. In the case of state-federal relations, however,
no such justification exists. The original impetus behind the enactment of the United States Constitution was precisely to avoid the
loss of welfare inherent in the recognition of state sovereignty. 34
The Commerce Clause in particular reflected a widespread recognition of the economic interdependence of the states. The fact that
even under the Articles of Confederation, the United States represented a unit insofar as foreign relations were concerned means that
state sovereignty had never been taken very seriously in this area. 35
The Constitution of 1789 made this even more clear by entirely
excluding the states from participation in foreign affairs and by
omitting any reference to state sovereignty. 36 The very recognition

33 This, I presume, would be the happy outcome for some postcolonial entities now in
existence.
34 See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1887, 463-67 (New York,
1972).
JS Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress, 173 note (1982). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Co., 299 U.S. 304,
315-19 (1936), although the historical accuracy of Justice Sutherland's claims may be questioned.
36 Article II of the Articles of Confederation stated: "Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." By contrast,
even the Tenth Amendment speaks only of "powers" not delegated to the United States as
remaining in the States (if not prohibited to them by the Constitution.)
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of the existence of the American nation and the creation of
the United States as the expression of its political will mean that the
Framers recognized the degree of real interdependence among the
states that made thinking of them in terms of sovereignty largely
inappropriate. States may have rights, powers, and immunities
within the federal compact, but they cannot be conceived as staying
outside of it.
The shape ultimately taken by the structure of governmental authority under the United States Constitution was one of compromise between the social, economic, and international realities and
some more purely political desiderata. The power represented by
the states had to be reckoned with and indeed was welcome insofar
as it could be harnessed into the complex structure of divided authority that was to be the main protection against what the Framers
called "tyranny"-a rather amorphous term referring to most
forms of governmental oppression. But at the same time the Framers wanted to ensure that the federal government would be unquestionably independent and superior in all matters of national importance. Only "local" matters were to be left in the hands of the
states.
Had the compromise of 1787 clearly left it to the federal government to determine what issues were or were not "local" (by, for
example, making such determinations largely political), 37 the question of state sovereignty would have become meaningless then and
there. But the Constitution appears to go further and attempts to
define negatively the scope of state power by the enumeration of
the powers of the national government. This could be, and often
was, interpreted as an effort to give an ahistorical definition of what
is "local." The enumeration technique of Article I, Section 8, thus
appears to constitutionalize the issue of state sovereignty by proposing a rigid, a priori distinction between the separate domains of
the two governments, instead of a more practical, ad hoc determination of their appropriate law-making functions.

37 Proposals of this kind were, indeed, before the Convention. The Virginia plan proposed
that "the National Legislature ought to be empowered ... to legislate in all cases, to which
the separate States are incompetent or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by exercise of individual legislation." The Convention voted on two occasions for
similar general formulations. See Farrand, I Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 47,
53 (1911); II id. at 21. The present scheme of enumeration emerged in the Committee of
Detail. See Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 83 (11th ed. 1985).
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If the matter of determining whether the Constitutional enumeration of the powers of the federal government implied a substantively defined domain of state sovereignty had arisen here for the
first time, an extensive discussion of all relevant considerations
would have been necessary. But the matter seems so definitively
settled by historical experience and the Supreme Court's decisions
that to rehearse once more the vicissitudes of the Commerce Clause
disputes would be an improvident expenditure of energy. In case
after case, the distinctions drawn by the courts that were supposed
to insure state supremacy over some substantive fields of regulation
have proved to be unworkable. In part, these efforts were designed
to map what the Court perceived as the political desiderata of
federalism onto the contours of economic life and to translate the
concept of dual sovereignty into the language of economics by
separating commerce from production. 38 Whatever validity a distinction between production and external commerce may have in
the case of international relations, one look at the supermarkets in
New York and California is enough to convince one of its inappropriateness in the context of the United States economy. Within the
American federal system, state boundaries have long lost most of
their economic significance, 39 and as early as the distinction between commerce and production appeared, the Court was forced to
modify it by the introduction of the concept of the "current" or
"flow" of commerce40 and to draw another, economically irrelevant, distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. 41 Similarly unsuccessful
were the Court's efforts to correlate the concept of dual sovereignty
with a distinction between the regulation of economic and social
activities. It was rightly observed that, in the absence of other
limitations, the power to regulate commerce could obviously be

38 United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (The Sugar Trust Case), 156 U.S. l (1895); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238
(1936). For a discussion of the heterogeneity of the political categories of federalism with
respect to economic reality, see Frankfurter, note 20 supra, at 21 (1937).
39 See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
40 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495,
514-16 (1922).
41 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). These two decisions prevented a total emasculation of the antitrust laws by the Sugar Trust Case.
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used to reach most activities related to morals and social, rather
than purely economic, concerns. Given the centrality of the states'
police powers to their function as independent governments, the
Coun, after a period of relative toleration of federal social legislation, 42 attempted to reserve for the states the exclusive authority to
regulate general welfare by restricting federal regulation to the "improvement" or "facilitation" of commerce (so that Congress could
prohibit commerce only in the case of intrinsically "harmful" objects),43 and interpreting the Article I, Section 8 delegation as
specifying not the permissible areas, but the permissible purposes,
of federal regulation. 44
All these effons, designed to preserve some exclusive domains of
state authority, have by and large collapsed with the New Deal
changes. 45 The cases since then have oscillated between the language requiring a "substantial effect" of the regulated activity on
interstate commerce as a condition of the federal power to regulate
it46 and a virtual repudiation of any judicial authority to place limits
on the Congressional power to determine the meaning of "local"
activities. 47 No decision, however, has in principle exempted any
substantive field from federal regulation. Also, even if some new
constitutional jurisprudence were to call for some limits on the
federal power over the private sector, an articulation of such limits
would require an essentially pragmatic analysis of the national and
local effects of the regulated activities and a search for solutions that
42 See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (191 I) (upholding the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act).
43 Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
44 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Corp. (fhe Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
45 See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding extensive federal regulation of labor relations and abandoning the "stream of
commerce" analysis); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of agriculture); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)(upholding federal criminal prohibition of "extortionate credit transactions" in the context of a "local" loan-sharking); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (extending the Heart of Atlanta Motel
rationale to all arguably purely local acts of discrimination).
46 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
47 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
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are the most adequate for the national welfare. The concerns of
federalism would not, of course, be irrelevant for this analysis, but
they would have to be viewed in terms of the values and functions
to be served by the states within the federal system and the a priori
concept of state sovereignty would have no role to play in such an
mqmry.
As a matter of fact, the usefulness of the idea of sovereignty in
discussing the governmental system of the United States at any
level, be it state or federal, is also quite limited. To be sure, in
terms of the relations between the United States and foreign countries, the Framers thought of the national (but not state) government, insofar as it represented the American people, as fully equal
to other powers and entitled to the same respect as any "sovereign"
nation. But in terms of domestic relations, the structure of government established by the Framers, with its written Constitution,
tripartite division of powers on the national level, decentralization
of authority involved in the federal system, and constraints imposed on the governments at all levels in favor of individuals and
private institutions, makes the positivistic concept of sovereignty of
questionable value both as an analytical tool and as a norm defining
a desirable feature of political organization. The very legitimation
of political authority in the United States seems to rest on a theory
that views unfavorably the location of sovereignty in any welldefined institution, preferring instead a dispersion of power and
authority as a mode of increasing political accountability. Even
with respect to the national government, therefore, it would be
impossible to point to a single body that "could do no wrong" as a
matter of principle and spread the protective mantle of sovereignty
to insulate itself in an a priori fashion from some superior form of
control.
If the Framers thought of anyone as "sovereign" in the United
States, they thought this of the people in whose name they purported to write the Constitution. The idea of popular sovereignty
had, of course, enjoyed widespread acceptance in the progressive
thought of the eighteenth century, and I am not prepared to discount the usefulness of such a conceptualization. What is characteristic, however, of the Framers' idea of the people, as it is spelled out
in the Constitution, is its complexity, if not amorphousness: the
Constitution neither defines the term in any unitary fashion nor
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considers its meaning self-evident. 48 Rather, the Constitution admits of a whole set of voices with which the people may speak, and
each of these voices is identified with one or another institutional
arrangement. It may be a set of conventions or a mixture of the
federal and state legislatures (in the case of constitutional amendments), or the Congress and the President acting together (in the
case of ordinary laws), or the Supreme Court (in the case of constitutional interpretation), but at no point, short of some violent
revolutionary changes that would sweep away the present constitutional order, does the Constitution envisage the people speaking
directly or with a voice that would trump all other voices by a
simple fiat. 49
The complexity of the concept of the people, as spelled out in the
Constitution, makes the idea of popular sovereignty very difficult
to work with and, in any case, useless for a defense of the a priori
notion of state sovereignty. For the voices with which the "people
speak" are always delegated. Even if some of them are institutionalized in the organs of the states, the whole difficulty lies in
identifying precisely those occasions on which the states exercise
the sovereign capacity that is delegated to them. It is, in fact, enough
to put it in this way to see that the word "sovereign" does not add
anything to what we must already know in order to apply it. In the
context of the positivist theory of sovereignty, a mere identification
of some person as the sovereign would allow one to learn something
one would not have necessarily known without it, such as that the
authority of that person is final not only in this particular instance
but also in all other instances of his actions on his subjects. But if
the sovereign authority is simply delegated, then we must know the
extent of the delegation. If we know this, however, we learn nothing more by saying that the representative speaks for the sovereign.
When speaking of the states, therefore, the task is to articulate some
independent grounds for saying that some of their decisions are
immune from federal interference, and not to call the states "sover48 I have derived much enlightenment on the meaning of the term "the people" in the
Constitution from my colleague, Bruce Ackerman. See his Storrs Lectures, Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. IO 13 (1984).
49 Even in its capacity to amend the Constitution, the people are limited by the nonamendability of the states' suffrage in the Senate. That the process of legislation is limited by the
requirement of constitutionality is obvious. The same is in principle true of the Supreme
Court's decisions, even if only an amendment can in practice overrule them.
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eign" in order to deduce anything from that. At the very least,
then, the idea of state sovereignty is of no help in elaborating a
theory of federalism. 50

Ill.

PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

A. GARCIA AND NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

The rejection of the label of "sovereignty" as inapplicable in any
meaningful sense to the American states does not mean that the
American federal system does not differ very significantly from
other well known systems of government, centralized or decentralized. Neither does it mean that the problems of federalism lack a
constitutional dimension, so that judicial review of federalismrelated limitations on the authority of the Congress or the Executive is necessarily inappropriate. My only point so far is that the
idea of state sovereignty is not useful in elaborating a respectable
theory of federalism and, a fortiori, in devising the adequate standards of judicial enforcement.
Seen in this light, the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San
Antonio MTA, coming down rather hard on the notion of state
sovereignty, should be viewed as the last logical step in a long
evolution of the sovereignty-based jurisprudence of federalism.
The bitter historical experience of the Supreme Court in trying to
apply the sovereignty-based limitations on national legislative powers, leading to the constitutional crisis of I937, had long ago convinced the Court and most commentators that the Article I enumeration of national powers provided no helpful ground for judicial
50 Very similar conclusions would follow if one were to look to the more recent discussions
of sovereignty by such political scientists as Leon Duguit (Souverainete et Liberte (1922)),
Hugo Krabbe (The Modern Idea of the State (1922)), and Harold J. Laski (Studies in the
Problem of Sovereignty (1917), Authority in the Modern State (1919)). The upshot of these
discussions is that the traditional concept of sovereignty simply obfuscates the fact that actual
authority in the modern states resides in an often shifting configuration of political, economic, and social groups, with the state being only one of the contenders. In view of these
theories, which also blur the distinction between various kinds of de facto authority possessed by extragovernmental interests and the control over legal forms possessed by governmental institutions, to say that the American states are sovereign would be patently false. At
most, one could say that the states should be counted among the various groups that constitute the pluralistic sovereign that is the United States, but the same could be said of the
Congress, the President, or even the Democratic Party. And to say this would, again, mean
no more than that the states in fact exercise some influence over the political and legal
decisions in the United States but would not make it any easier to determine what this
influence is or should be.
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intervention in the national political process, so that the courts were
left with only an ultraminimal role in this area, if any. Quite
significantly, however, the rhetoric of the Court's decisions did not
fully reflect what appeared to be the practice of Commerce Clause
adjudication: despite the fact that since 1937 no private activity has
ever been found in principle beyond the reach of the Commerce
Clause legislation, the "substantial effect" standard, 51 tied as it was
to the idea that the regulation of purely local activities was reserved
exclusively to the states (and thus potentially to the notion of the
states' sovereign domains), was upheld in theory and a certain
amount of unease, occasionally rising to the level of a dissent, could
be detected in the pronouncements of various justices with respect
to the absence of any genuine judicial check on real or hypothetical
encroachments on state prerogatives by the federal government. 52
Although the Garcia decision does not in its terms overrule the
"substantial effect" standard and although its own language is not
entirely free from the rhetoric of state sovereignty, 5 3 its main thrust
is to reject the usefulness of the sovereignty-based analysis and to
replace it with a focus on the nature of the political process responsible for making the federalism-related decisions. Consequently,
Garcia stresses the fact that the Constitution "divested" the states of
"their original powers" and that it is futile to try to "identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a priori
definitions of state sovereignty. " 54 Instead, the decision proposes to
51 Congress has the power to exercise control over activities that have "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce." NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I,
37 (1937); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
l,nited States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
52 A good example of such unease may be found in Justice Black's dissent in Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 315 (1969). Another, and quite interesting, expression of the same
unease may be found in Justice Jackson's opinion in United States v. Five Gambling Devices,
346 U.S. 441 (1953). Cf Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reel. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981), where he states that the idea that Congress's power to reach private activities is limited is "one of the greatest 'fictions' of our
federal system."
53 Justice Blackmun's opinion affirms that while "the sovereignty of the States is limited by
the Constitution," 105 S.Ct. at 1017, "[t]he States unquestionably 'retain a significant measure of sovereign authority' ... to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Id. Similar
statements appear throughout the opinion, and its ultimate holding is that the contested
provisions of the FLSA are not "destructive of state sovereignty." 105 S.Ct. at 1020.
54 105 S.Ct. at 1016.
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rely primarily on the political safeguards of federalism 55 and to
ground any future judicial intervention not in a defense of state
sovereignty but in the idea of compensating for possible failings in
the national political process. 56
The only exception to the steady move away from the sovereignty-based jurisprudence of federalism since 1937 seems to have
been the 1976 National League of Cities decision, overruled in Garcia.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National League of Cities
drew very heavily on the "fact" that the immunities enjoyed by the
states derived from their "sovereignty"57 and the main holding of
the case was anchored in his observation that "[o]ne undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ to carry out
their governmental functions. " 58 The subsequent reformulation of
the holding of National League of Cities, given in Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Min. & Reel.
Ass'n, 59 made the concept of state sovereignty into the focal point of
its three-pronged test60 and it was this focus that shaped the Garcia
response.
It is an important question, however, whether National League of
Cities really needed to rely on the idea of state sovereignty to justify
its holding and, if it did not, whether the Garcia response was not,
at least in part, inapposite.
The first point to note in this context is that the principle announced in National League of Cities, namely, that the states should
be immune from federal interference in structuring their own governmental operations, was significantly different from the previous
See note 7 supra.
Garcia v. San Antonio MTA, 105 S.Ct. at 1019-20: "[A]ny substantive restraint on the
exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of
[the] basic limitation [the Constitution imposes to protect the states], and it must be tailored
to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
'sacred province of state autonomy.' "
57 426 U.S. at 833, 843 n.14.
58 426 U.S. at 845.
59 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
60 "[A] claim that congressional commerce clause legislation is invalid under the reasoning
of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a
showing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as States.' Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.' And
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional function.' " Ibid.
55

56
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attempts to protect state rights that had concentrated on assuring
the states' supremacy in regulating substantive, private activities
supposedly outside the enumerated powers of the national government. The significance of this difference lay precisely in the fact
that the immunity granted to the states by the National League of
Cities, like most other limitations imposed on the authority of the
national (or, for that matter, state) government-by the Bill of
Rights, for example-did not have to derive from the displacement
of the federal power by another sovereign but could rather be
conceptualized as yet another check on the concentration of power
in general, for the sake of protecting certain forms oflife or preventing arbitrary and tyrannical imposition by some interests upon
others. To say that the federal government cannot unduly interfere
with the states' ability to structure their governmental operations or
that it cannot destroy their "separate and independent existence" 61
need, in and of itself, no more rely on the concept of state sovereignty than the prohibition of state interference with the membership of a private association 62 must recognize that association's "sovereignty" or the protection of the Episcopalians' right to associate
and exercise their religion must imply the "sovereignty" of the
Episcopal Church. What seems rather to be true in all of these cases
is that the very principle of sovereignty, wherever located, is circumscribed by the Constitution, in favor of the idea of limited
government.
It is the case, of course, that the holding of National League of
Cities attempted to protect governmental, and not private, institutions. This fact is not without significance, but the decision did not
protect the states as governmental institutions in the sense-crucial
for the preservation of state sovereignty-of assuring their ability
to impose the ultimate rules of conduct in any given area of extragovernmental activities. In interpreting the Tenth Amendment,
the National League of Cities Court did not rely on any "residue" of
nondelegated state powers; the opinion straightforwardly admitted
that the regulation of wages at issue in the case was "undoubtedly
within the scope of the Commerce Clause. " 63 The exception carved
61

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.

559, 580 (1911)).
62

Cf NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

63

426 C.S. at 841.
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out from the federal powers pertained exclusively to the immunity
of internal state governmental processes, and nothing in the opinion
even remotely implied that the federal government could not reach
any private activity. Whatever sovereign power (in the sense of an
ultimate power to control the activities of third parties) was therefore seen as vested in any governmental body in the United States
was squarely seen as vested in the national authorities, all the
rhetoric of "state sovereignty" notwithstanding.
This aspect of National League of Cities was not sufficiently appreciated in the subsequent decisions of the Court. For example,
Justice Blackmun, in his opinion for the majority in FERG v. Mississippi, 64 intimates that the existence of the federal power to preempt
state utilities regulation justified, or at least mitigated the constitutional problems with, federal interference with state regulatory
processes in the area. 65 If this argument were to be taken seriously,
then it either rendered National League of Cities meaningless long
before its ultimate overruling (for, given universal preemptibility, it
left no state governmental function immune from federal interference) or conditioned its continued vitality on the existence of some
areas of regulation reserved exclusively to the states. But if the
latter interpretation were to be chosen, the novelty of National
League of Cities had to disappear since it no longer could be viewed
as protecting merely the structural integrity of state governments
and required the continuation of the old sovereignty-based analysis. Thus interpreted, National League of Cities would have indeed
deserved to be overruled.
In fact, however, putting aside the unfortunate references to
state sovereignty in National League of Cities and its progeny, there is
a certain jurisprudential affinity between the approaches taken in
Garcia and in the 1976 decision. While the practical chances of any

456 U.S. 742, 761-66 (1982).
Strictly speaking, Justice Blackmun stopped short of finding that the possibility of
preemption justified direct federal control of state instrumentalities since he also found that
the state was free to withdraw from the field of utilities regulation altogether if it did not wish
to submit to the federal commands. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun himself saw that the
possibility of state withdrawal was no more than theoretical, especially in view of the
Congressional failure to provide for any alternative regulatory mechanism. 456 U.S. at 766.
For all practical purposes, therefore, the argument amounted to legitimizing federal control
over the state regulatory processes in all preemptible fields. It must be noted, however, that
the question of when a federal action on the states amounts to coercion was one of the
fundamental issues not sufficiently addressed by the National League of Cities and its progeny.
64

65
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future invalidation of national legislation on the grounds of conflict
with the requirements of federalism appear to be small for the time
being, in theory at least Garcia leaves the door open for a certain
amount of judicial supervision of the national political process. The
safeguards of federalism, according to the Garcia majority, lie
primarily "in the structure of the Federal Government itself," 66
which guarantees to the states a certain amount of influence on the
national level. Clearly, should the constitutionally required composition of the federal government be directly infringed on (for example by decoupling the choice of the Senators from the state
electoral base), the Court would be obliged to intervene. But Garcia
goes significantly further, for it does not preclude the possibility
that even a properly composed national authority may insufficiently protect the interests of the states. All that Garcia, on its face,
requires is that a justification of any federalism-related limitation on
the national government be one of "process" (rather than relying on
the alleged existence of some " 'sacred province of state autonomy' ") and that the process failure, required for judicial intervention, be on the national level. 67 But while the justification of the
"restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers" must be one
of "process," the restraint itself may be "substantive, "68 that is,
need not be limited to assuring the proper amount of state influence
on the federal level but may instead address itself directly to the
problem of national overreaching.
Viewed from this perspective, the gist of Garcia's holding lies not
in ruling out as nonjusticiable all matters of federalism-related limitations on national power, but rather in formulating an approach to
the elaboration of the judicial standards of review. This approach
has much in common with the "process jurisprudence" originating
in the famous footnote four of the Carotene Products decision 69 and
subsequently elaborated in the scholarly literature. 70 The assumption of this approach is that the Constitution largely confines the
outcomes of governmental action to the political process and that

67

105 S.Ct. at 1018.
105 S.Ct. at l019-20 (citing EEOC,·. Wyoming, 460 C.S. 226, 236 (1983)).

68

Ibid. (emphasis added).

66

United States,·. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
See, above all, Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), and Lusky, By What Right?
(1975).
69

70
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judicial review should, with a few exceptions related to very concrete substantive provisions in the Constitution, be directed toward
preserving the integrity of the political process, keeping open the
channels of political change, and so on. In elaborating this theory of
judicial review, however, process jurisprudence does not limit the
scope of judicial intervention to explicitly procedural remedies or to
the enforcement of specifically procedural principles. It aims rather
at an elaboration of judicial standards, the justification of which
does not rely on the desirability of specific substantive results but
rests instead on the identification of some defects in the political
process that prevent it from operating in accordance with the function assigned to it in the Constitution. Thus, for example, in reviewing governmental actions that may inhibit free speech or discriminate against certain minorities, a court sympathetic to the
tenets of process jurisprudence will feel free to elaborate the standards of review that will directly address the substantive issues of
free speech or minority rights, but it will justify them not so much
in terms of the autonomous values of speech or equality as in terms
of their role in the properly functioning democratic process and will
attempt to identify some distortions in that process that account for
its presumably abnormal results. Seen in this light, the protection
of free speech will be related, say, to the idea of informed consent
as a basis of democratic legitimation, while discriminatory legislation will be viewed, say, as an outcome of restricted access by
discrete and insular minorities to the trade-offs and compromises
that are supposed to prevent systematic exploitation of minority
interests in a well-functioning democratic society. 71
In the context of federalism, the process jurisprudence endorsed
by Garcia, if I interpret it correctly, does not imply, therefore, an
unconditional rejection of even the specific principle of the protection of the integrity of state governmental operations put forth by
the National League of Cities so long as this principle is not rooted in
71 By giving these examples, I do not mean to suggest that they represent the correct
applications of the principles of process jurisprudence. For a critique of the reasoning underlying the protection of minority rights indicated in the text, see Ackerman, Beyond Carotene
Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985). I also recognize that it may be impossible to specify
the characteristics of a well-functioning political process without anchoring them in a theory
of substantive values that the process is supposed to realize. See Brest, The Substance of
Process, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 13 I, 134-37 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980). This last issue will be
considered further in section B infra.
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the assumption of state sovereignty. Should it turn out, for example, on the basis of a well-grounded analysis of the significance
of local politics for the proper functioning of the national political
process, that certain systemic characteristics of the national government make it prone to fail to recognize the interdependence between its own health and the robustness of political life in the
states, the Court might view with suspicion federal interference
with the integrity of some vital governmental operations of the
states, in much the same way as it applied its "strict scrutiny"
analysis to governmental actions involving race-based classifications. 72
Moreover, if one can abstract from the rhetoric of sovereignty in
National League of Cities and some of its progeny, the ideas of process
jurisprudence are not entirely absent from their analyses and could
profitably be further developed. Thus, for example, much of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities is not directed to
the problem of state sovereignty but rests on an analysis of the
impact of the 1974 FLSA Amendments (requiring that minimum
wages be paid to state employees) on the states' ability to structure
their internal operations and the relation between the need to preserve this ability and the role assigned to the states within the
federal system. Posing the issue in this way implies that the principles of National League of Cities derive from the structure of government set up under the Constitution, rather than from some preexisting immunity of the states, due to their status as sovereigns that
the Constitution could not or did not abrogate. This is even more
clear in the elaboration of the principles of National League of Cities
given by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi. 73
After making a questionable statement that "each State is sovereign
within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for
their general welfare," 74 Justice O'Connor proceeded to analyze the
statute at issue in terms of its impact on the states' ability to funcSee Korematsu v. United States, 323 l.!.S. 214 (1944).
456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982). Justice O'Connor's dissent in FERC was joined by Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Berger, both of whom were in the majority in National League of
Cities. Additionally, Justice Powell, another member of the National League of Cities majority,
expressed his agreement with the "wisdom" of "Justice O'Connor's evocation of the principles of federalism." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 C.S. at 775 (Justice Powell, concurring and
dissenting).
74 Id. at 777.
72

73
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tion within the federal system and pointed to the values to be
served by state autonomy under our constitutional scheme. Among
these values and functions, Justice O'Connor listed the enhancement of the political accountability of officials, the function of the
states as "laboratories for the development of new social, economic,
and political ideas," 75 the enhancement of "the opportunity of all
citizens to participate in representative government, " 76 and the provision of "a salutary check on governmental power." 77
No special attempt was made in most of these statements to
relate the protection of the integrity of state governmental operations to any specific analysis of the failure of the political process on
the national level, as eventually required by Garcia, since the protection of state interests was presumed by Justice O'Connor to be
constitutionally required by the principles of federalism, independently of the specific guarantees of local representation on the national level. But it might not be very difficult to relate the concerns
of the National League of Cities's proponents to the problems inherent
in the national government as it has developed in the post-Civil
War period, and particularly in the last fifty years and to point out
the effect of those changes on the political protection of the interests
of the states as envisaged by the Framers. 78 What is more important, however, than the question of where the protection of the
states is textually anchored in the Constitution (in the provisions
specifying the composition of the federal government or in the
Tenth Amendment) is the elaboration of a constitutional theory of
federalism in terms of the functions assigned to the political processes envisaged by the Constitution and the relation between those
functions and the actual operation of governmental institutions. In
this respect, both Garcia (insofar as it leaves room for a judicial
review of the federalism-related implications of national action) and
National League of Cities (insofar as it may have grounded its holding
in a functional analysis of the role of the states within the federal
system) are on the right track. They both recognize the special role
75

Id. at 788.

76

Id. at 789.

Id. at 790.
An argument of this kind is indicated in Part B of Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in
Garcia. 105 S.Ct. 1025-27; see particularly footnote 9. Among scholarly contributions, of
particular importance in this context is Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979).
77
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of the analysis of institutional arrangements and processes set up by
the Constitution for the judicial evaluation of the substantive outcomes that these arrangements and processes engender. But both
these cases fail to move beyond the programatic stages in the formulation of the analysis they require and proceed to a conclusory
resolution of complex problems of federalism: National League Cities
by laying down a blanket prohibition on the interference with
the vaguely defined "traditional governmental functions" of
the states, 79 Garcia by simply relegating the protection of unspecified state interests to an insufficiently analyzed national political
process.
B. THE NATURE OF PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS
MISCONCEPTIONS

1. Substantive values and process jurisprudence. To develop a theory
of federalism along the lines of process jurisprudence, we must
have a fairly good idea of the nature of the political processes envisaged by the Constitution and the functions that the document
assigns to them. On this point the opinions in both Garcia and
National League of Cities are most deficient. National League of Cities,
in laying down its principle of the protection of state governmental
processes, simply stated that the protection extended to governmental functions and activities that were termed "traditional, " 80
"integral, " 81 "typical, " 82 "important," "essential" or "required, " 8 3
without explaining how and why these terms related to the basic
values of federalism. Garcia, on the other hand, seized on the lack of
clarity in these criteria and declared that the values of federalism
are "more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
the federal system. " 84 The opinion of the Court lists a series of
constitutional provisions assuring to the states a role in the operation of the national government, 85 but it never attempts to specify

79

426 U.S. at 851,852,855.

so Ibid.
81

Id. at 851,852,854 n.18, 855.

82

Id. at 851.

83

Id. at 845,846, 847, 850, 851.

84

105 S.Ct. at 1018.

85

Ibid.
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what the protected values are or how they are related to the procedural safeguards referred to by the Court.
The other sources inspired by the ideas of process jurisprudence
are not of much help either. To begin with, the issue of federalism
is simply absent from the list of problems that the Carotene Products
footnote 86 identified as potentially enhancing the level of judicial
scrutiny, and the issue rarely appears in the further elaborations of
its doctrine. 87 But more importantly than that, even though the
idea that constitutional adjudication is primarily concerned with
protecting the integrity of the political process, rather than some
substantive outcomes or entitlements, has been much in vogue for a
while, the legal profession has been rather slow in developing a
sophisticated theory of political processes or in applying the results
available from political science to the problems of constitutional
interpretation. The basic problem with the concept of process, as
understood by the exponents of process jurisprudence, is its narrow
focus on representative political institutions and their function of
expressing the will of the majority.
The crudest version of the process theory would look something
like this: The Constitution is a democratic document, which means
that the decisions of the majority of the representatives freely
elected by the majority of the people should not be upset, and
judicial intervention-which always raises a prima facie presumption of countermajoritarianism-should be limited to cases in
which something in the process suggests that the decision deviates
from the majority's will.
While this version of the theory may look too simplistic, the
more sophisticated versions seem to proceed from it as a starting
point in order to add a few refinements. This is done by Ely, for

Note 69 supra.
Some efforts at applying the footnote's ideas to the review of state legislation that might
conflict with the "dormant" federal Commerce Clause powers were made by Justice Stone in
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938),
and Southern Pacific Co. v. Ariwna, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945), where he explained that
the usual deference to state legislative judgments is suspended in cases when such legislation
may discriminate against out-of-state interests because of the absence of the representation
(even in the virtual sense) of those interests in the state legislature. The idea of "virtual
representation" is further picked up by Ely in his Democracy and Distrust, note 70 supra, at
82-87. While no explicitly process-oriented work approaches the subject of federalismrelated limitations on the national authorities, of great value in this context is Kaden, note 78
86
87

supra.
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example, 88 by concentrating on two aspects of the majoritarian rule:
(1) assuring that the selecting process is truly responsive to the
interests of those who are represented and (2) protecting minority
interests from systematic exploitation by the majority due to the
majority's "simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest. " 89 The first of these considerations yields
such normative postulates as guaranteeing the right to vote, assuring the proper dissemination of information, and facilitating the
expression and advocacy of citizens' interests. The second type of
consideration (as well as those aspects of the first that guard against
the evils of ignorance) introduces a certain modification into the
premise of unqualified majoritarianism. Majority rule is not perhaps a good per se but rather a system in which every interest has a
chance to succeed some of the time in the political world of the
trade-offs and compromises that are necessary to form a majority in
a universe of diverse interests. The ultimate justification of majority rule is thus its basic fairness, but this would be undermined if
some groups were to be systematically excluded from the political
give-and-take because other people are either uninformed or motivated by irrational hostility, and this gives rise to the jurisprudence
of "suspect classifications. "90
Something along the lines of this version of the process theory
must have been at the bottom of the famous state reapportionment
cases, 91 which laid down the blanket rule of "one man, one vote" as
the logical conclusion of the majoritarian democratic theory. What
is rather amazing about it, however, is that the theory, without
more (indeed, much more), is incapable of giving any account of
most of the processes and structures set up by the federal Constitution, be they related to the separation of powers or (in particular) to
the representative imbalance characteristic of the federal system. 92
Ely himself does not believe that the "one man, one vote" conclusion is ineluctable and explains it with reference to administrative

88

Ely, note 70 supra.

89

Id. at 103.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (19H).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Revnolds v. Sims, 377 C.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); WMCA Inc.,·. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964).
92 See Bishin, Judicial Re,·iew in Democratic Theory, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1099 (1977).
90
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concerns, 93 but neither does his book contain any explanation of the
peculiarly procedural provisions unrelated to, or deviating from,
the principle of majority rule that occupy the bulk of the Constitution. 94 To be sure, Ely does say that deviations from the "one man,
one vote" principle are not inherently irrational, 95 but what passes
in silence is that the rationality of such deviations cannot, in most
instances, be judged with reference to some exclusively procedural
principles. 96 Even a genuine legitimation of majority rule calls for
some further substantive justification, such as the Rousseauean
theory of popular sovereignty or the Madisonian (and Ely's) theory
of fairness resulting from pragmatic accommodations. But in a system as complex as that of the American government, the dominance of any one principle of legitimation (such as the democratic
concept of popular sovereignty or fairness in the distribution of
governmental favors) is very unlikely to provide a good explanation
of the whole structure of governmental institutions. Even a cursory
reading of the Constitution and the work of those who wrote it or
participated in the ratification debates will immediately show the
crucial role of such values as individual autonomy, citizen participation, the sanctity of property, secularism, economic growth, the
fostering of civic virtues, and so on. And it is even more doubtful
that this plurality of substantive values underlying the constitutional order could find its expression in a single dominant procedural feature, such as majority rule. As a matter of fact, the

Ely, note 70 supra, at 116-25.
The only facet of the separation of powers that receives a plausible justification in Ely's
book (and indeed is its basic leitmotif) is, ironically, the one not explicitly mentioned in the
text of the Constitution: judicial review.
95 Ely, note 70 supra, at 121.
96 Ely, ibid., mentions in this context that the Equal Protection Clause often allows for
unequal treatment if it is "rationally explainable." But this remark, while relevant to the
Court's ostensible grounding of the reapportionment cases in the Equal Protection Clause, is
inapposite in the context of the underlying Republican Form of Government Clause that he
admits is also relevant here. The mere rationality of some decision is a far cry from its
legitimacy: a lot of perfectly abhorrent laws might be rational and still unacceptable. What
legitimizes most laws challenged under equal protection, on Ely's own terms, is that they
have been passed by a democratically legitimate legislature, with rationality being an only
minimal additional component. But in the case of a decision that disenfranchises (or dilutes
the votes of) a part of the population or, even more clearly, that results from such a disenfranchisement (or dilution), the usual democratic legitimation is precisely absent and some
other form of legitimation is necessary. It seems to me very doubtful that an ultimately
satisfying form of legitimation (even in the same degree as a simple reference to majority rule
may be satisfying) of such decisions could be purely procedural.
93

94

372

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

(1985

Constitution reveals many clearly antimajoritarian features that are
probably incomprehensible without a reference to some of the substantive values just mentioned.
2. Process jurisprudence and individual rights. Where does this leave
us with respect to the utility of process jurisprudence for the formulation of the effective standards of judicial review, particularly
in the area of federalism? Doesn't the account given here, by requiring an explanation of the procedural features of political institutions in terms of the substantive values underlying the political
process, negate the whole enterprise of process jurisprudence and
lead us back to evaluating the outcomes of the political process in
terms of some substantive "fundamental values" that the whole
approach was designed to avoid?
The answer is that the idea of process jurisprudence need not be
abandoned simply because the theory must admit of the existence
of some substantive values, but rather that the purpose and the
methods of process jurisprudence must be further clarified and its
ambitions somewhat scaled down. The primary aim of a process
theory, which may have been widely misconceived, is not to eliminate the idea of substantive values from constitutional interpretation or to reduce them to purely procedural terms but to understand the specific role played by institutions in the realm of social
and political life. And in this context, to say that an institution has a
particular function that must be accounted for in terms of some
substantive values the institution is supposed to serve does not
mean that the peculiar process-related characteristics of the institution do not acquire independent significance or that one may ignore
its internally generated interests and purposes. What I take to be
the most promising aspect of Garcia's endorsement of the processanalysis approach to the problem of federalism is not, therefore, its
arguable reduction of the meaning of federalism to a few purely
procedural arrangements through which the states have some voice
in national politics, but rather its implicit call for a complex account
of the nature of the federalist institutions. Even to begin to vindicate Garcia's promise in this respect, one must, above all, have the
rudiments of a general theory of political processes that would
allow us to understand why the Constitution concentrates as
heavily as it does on the protection of the integrity of processes and
institutions rather than directly on the substantive values these
processes and institutions are supposed to serve. Armed with such
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a general theory, one may then apply it to explain the functioning
of a particular institutional arrangement, such as federalism, and its
possible pathological distortions. The process-oriented analysis of
federalism would thus not deny that the federalist institutions do
indeed serve further substantive purposes, such as the preservation
of individual freedom or citizen participation in government, but it
would also not stop at a mere identification of such purposes. Instead, it would proceed to show how respect for the integrity of the
federalist political process might more effectively promote the very
substantive values federalism is supposed to serve than any attempt
to enforce those values directly. It would also identify those features of the federalist institutions that might be susceptible to
pathological developments.
We must begin, then, by outlining the general considerations that
explain the importance of focusing on the inner dynamic of political
processes. The reason why, without deeper reflection, it is easy to
miss the point of a theory of political institutions that entails the
idea that political structures and processes have their own, selfgenerated claims to autonomy is that most of us simply assume that
government should serve the people. On this assumption and the
one that the "people" is not a mystical, abstract entity but rather
the sum of the individuals concerned, it can easily be shown that
the well-being of individuals is the ultimate justification of any
governmental arrangement or institution. It is only a step from this,
in turn, to an approach that neglects the analysis of the structures of
political life and concentrates on assuring that the individuals are
protected against governmental abuse through a system of rights.
Nevertheless, without ever questioning the self-evident proposition
that governments are ultimately supposed to serve the people, it is
not the case that all constitutional principles concerning institutional arrangements can be translated directly into the language of
individual rights. Everyone, or at least every lawyer, seems to
understand this when, say, a question concerning separation of
powers is raised. Clearly, separation of powers was designed to
prevent the oppression of individuals. Nevertheless, there exists no
individual right, inhering in United States citizens as such, to have
a government composed of the three branches listed in the Constitution. Indeed, separation of powers seems to have been conceived as an institutional arrangement precisely because it was
thought unrealistic to expect that any system of individual rights
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would be sufficient to guarantee that the government would respect
those rights and that what the framers called "tyranny" would not
ensue. The creation of some stronger interest than an individual
one was deemed necessary for this, and supraindividual (institutional) bodies were created to watch over each other to forestall the
rise of an oppressive government. The Framers seem in fact to have
had such confidence in this institutional approach that they at first
neglected to provide the alternative guarantees of individual rights,
and many argued that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary. But even
the enactment of the Bill of Rights did not change the fact that the
two approaches-the institutional one and the one promoting individual rights-are profoundly distinct and that the foundation of
the institutional approach derives from an acknowledgment of the
autonomy of supraindividual bodies within any well-conceived
constitutional theory. It is tempting, indeed, under the guise of
avoiding mystification or through simple ignorance, to view political and institutional phenomena through the prism of individual
relations. Quite sophisticated politicians are not unknown to have
argued that budget deficits are bad because a family that goes too
deeply into debt is bound to face disastrous consequences. 97 Nevertheless, such a reductionist approach misses one of the fundamental
verities of the political theory underlying much of our constitutional law.
In explaining why an institutional or group-oriented approach is
a necessary complement to the individual-rights-oriented approach
to protecting individuals, we do not have to rely exclusively on the
insights of the Framers, valuable as they are, because there are also
some very important data of more recent vintage that throw new
light on many of the old problems. I have particularly in mind the
achievements of the so-called theory of public goods, developed by
modern economics and social science, 98 which allows us to explain
some peculiar features of institutional arrangements.
A "public good" is something that many people consider desir97 President Roosevelt is reported to have made this argument in this first presidential
campaign.
98 The following discussion is heavily influenced by Olson's The Logic of Collective
Action (1965). Olson's theory, which has potentially enormous implications with respect to
many legal issues, has been rarely used by lawyers outside the law and economics area. For a
summary of more recent research on the subject, see Hardin, Collective Action (1982).
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able and would be willing to pay for 99 but which has the following
two characteristics: First, the good is of such a nature that once it is
available it is not possible to discriminate between those who actually paid for it and those who did not by making the good available
only to the former and not the latter. Thus, clean environment and
living in a democratic society are examples of public goods, because
once the environment has been cleaned up it benefits both those
who paid for the clean-up and those who did not, and once a
democratic government is installed it is not possible to take away
most of its benefits from those who did not vote. Second, because a
large number of contributors, each of whose contributions is relatively small, is necessary for the achievement of the good, no individual contribution "matters" by itself, that is, no individual's contribution can be said to be decisive with respect to whether or not
the good will in fact be made available. Thus, for example, since
almost no election is decided by one vote, it is extremely unlikely
that any individual's voting or not voting will significantly affect
the outcome of a large election.
The problem posed by the existence of public goods is that each
self-maximizing individual has an incentive to "free ride" on the
contributions of others in the achievement of any goods of this
kind. Imagine, for example, that a contribution of no more than one
dollar from each consumer of automobiles would be more than
enough to organize a lobby that would successfully persuade the
legislature to pass antitprotectionist laws that would lower the price
of automobiles and benefit each consumer at least $100. Nevertheless, each self-interested consumer is tempted by the following
reasoning: "If a sufficiently large number of other consumers contribute $ 1.00 each, the legislation will pass and I will gain $ 100
even if I don't contribute anything. If, on the other hand, a
sufficiently large number of other consumers do not make their
contributions, then even if I contribute $99.99 (the largest amount
that it could still make sense for me to contribute), the legislation
will not pass anyway and I will have simply lost my money. One
99 By "willingness to pay" I understand the willingness to contribute not only a monetary
payment but also any expenditure of time or energy that an individual may be ready to make
to obtain the good in question. Thus, the time and effort required to go to the polls, for
example, is something that an individual must "pay" for the exercise of his or her voting
rights.
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way or the other, therefore, I am better off by not contributing at
all." As a consequence of such perfectly rational behavior it is clear
that in a society composed of self-maximizing individuals, the provision of public goods will be inherently suboptimal: some, if not
most, such goods will not be made available, even though each
individual will be made worse off as a result. 100
It should be quite obvious-though the consequences of this fact
are rather complex-that most benefits derived from a democratic
government, and in particular freedom from governmental oppression, are public goods. It is, of course, possible for a government to
discriminate among its subjects by conferring some benefitsincluding political or civil rights-on some people and not others,
but at least insofar as the groups targeted for oppression are concerned, the availability of civic and political rights to some individuals is inextricably linked with their availability to others. Indeed,
it is a well-known strategy of many oppressive governments to
maintain their power over everyone by a policy of pitting their
opponents against each other. And insofar as our views of freedom
may link it to a certain amount of basic equality of rights among the
citizens-surely a view congenial to the American constitutional
tradition-the possibility that some, but not all, can be free may
even be theoretically unsound.
At a minimum, then, success in protecting individual rights
against a tyrannical government is a public good and its achievement may be seriously frustrated by the free-rider phenomenon.
For while republican rhetoric often claims that to die in the struggle
for freedom is an honor and a privilege, only a very few subjects of
tyrannical governments seem to covet this distinction. Despite the
claims made by such governments that the lack of resistance is a
sign of popular support, the more plausible explanation is that
individual acts of heroism, in the absence of some assurance that
one's fellow citizens are going to join the resistance in sufficient
100 Note that the realization on the part of the free riders that this is indeed so is not
sufficient to change anything. Thus, the common objection to free riding-"If everyone
were to behave in this way (say, refuse to contribute $1.00 to consumer legislation), we
would all be worse off"-is based on a fallacy since the free rider grants the truth of this
statement but adds that, since his contribution is insignificant and since whether or not
others contribute does not depend in any way on whether or not he contributes, it by no
means follows from the objection just raised that he should contribute. It is important to
understand that the free rider's answer is not a gimmick but rather expresses a real conflict
between private and collective interests.
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numbers to offer at least a chance of success, are perceived as
wasted efforts. Those who are willing to pay the greatest price for
regaining their freedom turn in such situations to organizing their
fellow citizens rather than to overt acts of disobedience.
A theory of organization as the most effective weapon in defeating the free-rider phenomenon is thus, not surprisingly, one of the
most important aspects of the public-goods theory. In general, the
free-rider phenomenon can be overcome, in the absence of significant moral or other altruistic motivations, only by a modification of
the incentives of some or all the potential beneficiaries. Outright
compulsion-in the form of a threat of violence or other retaliation
for noncontribution-is one form in which such incentives are
modified. 101 Peer pressure, in cases in which the fact of noncontribution is known and exposes the noncontributor to disapproval
of those with whose opinions he must reckon, is another. Tying
one's contribution to those of others, as when, for example, a donor
to some cause promises to match the contributions of other donors,
is also a way of diminishing the incentive to free ride. Finally, a
creation of some additional benefit, other than the public good, that
a contributor may derive from his contribution (such as the availability of a special insurance offered only to dues-paying union
members) 102 is sometimes an effective way of overcoming the freerider phenomenon. But if the group of potential beneficiaries is
large and diffuse enough for peer pressure not to have great
significance, the employment of all these incentive modifications
can be effective only when the group is organized.
To begin with, an organization with some financial means at its
disposal is able to hire a group of persons who, being paid, have a
special incentive to devote much more time and energy to the cause
of achieving the public good in question than would be rational for
any individual with only limited stakes (such as the consumer of
automobiles who can gain at most $100 from anti protectionist legislation). Second, once an organization with established links to the
group members exists, the cost of identifying all potential contributors and of disseminating information among them is greatly
reduced and this is often the single most important cost involved in
101 Thus, the state, by providing criminal penalties, modifies the incentive not to pay
taxes; a labor union, by threatening violence, modifies the incentives of strike breakers.
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See Olson, note 98 supra, at 72-73.
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bringing a collective effort to fruition. Third, the existence of special benefits to modify the incentives of individual contributors is
very often already implied in an existing organization, as when the
approval of church authorities is an important factor in the motivation of individual members, and the devising of new special benefits
of this kind is greatly facilitated. Finally, while the threat of violence with respect to noncontributors may be prohibited by law, a
whole host of sanctions may be available to an organization the
members of which derive some independent benefits from their
membership.
While the existence of an organization is the single most important factor in enhancing the effective achievement of a public good,
it is at the same time the most difficult to bring about. Not only are
the initial costs of organizing the highest, but also the incentives of
any member of an unorganized group to incur them are the lowest.
Once an organization is in place, on the other hand, it tends to
develop a set of incentives, both for the leadership and the rankand-file members, to perpetuate and expand the existing structure,
so that the efficacy of collective action is radically improved. And it
is this set of factors that explains why an institutional approach to
protecting the well-being of individuals is a necessary complement
to an individual-rights approach. 103 For, if most benefits of democracy are public goods, and if organization is necessary for their
effective defense, it is logical, in structuring a constitutional order,
to make sure that in addition to any protection of individual rights,
an institutionalized framework is always available for the protection
of the collective interest of the individuals who might find themselves threatened with exclusion and exploitation. In fact, the solutions adopted by the Framers are best analyzed in light of this
consideration.
But while the process-oriented approach to constitutional law
confers an independent status on institutional arrangements and
does not permit a direct translation of the talk about institutions
into a language of individual rights, it is also incorrect to say, as

103 It is to be noted, however, that even the individual-rights approach, insofar as it does
not simply confer entitlements on individuals but rests on a creation of a judicial machinery
of enforcement, contains an important element of institutional support. It was, however, the
inherent weakness of judicial institutions, when not backed up by more complex political
arrangements, that made the Framers look beyond them.
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some commentators have argued 104 and as the Garcia Court sometimes implies with respect to federalism, that the Framers' choice of
a primarily institutional approach to the protection of constitutionally significant values and interests renders those values and interests inherently "political" and, in the absence of specific constitutional provisions in favor of individuals, unsuitable for judicial
enforcement. In fact, an argument of this kind would constitutionally degrade those very objectives and purposes which, while peculiarly incapable of conceptualization in terms of judicially enforceable individual rights, may lie close to the core of constitutional
government. For the very essence of the process-oriented approach
is that certain fundamental values cannot be sufficiently protected
by a conferral of entitlements on individuals, either because their
enforcement would be inefficient or because the courts would lack
any manageable standards of adjudication. But precisely because
the values at stake are fundamental, if some institutional arrangements can be devised to protect them indirectly, such arrangements
may themselves become a part of the constitutional structure and
their protection (insofar as it does not raise the difficulties related to
the enforcement of a corresponding individual right) might be
vested in the judicial department rather than left to the vagaries of
momentary political expediency. 105 Thus, while the courts would,
for the most part, respect the outcomes of the political process, they
would also police it by making sure that the process does not distort
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
According to two prominent scholars, such was indeed the reason why National League
of Cities protected the integrity of state governmental institutions. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065-1104 (1977); Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J.
1165-1195 (1977). It was the claim of Tribe and Michelman that the immunity granted to
state governments in National League of Cities should be understood not as deriving from
the federalist concerns of the Tenth Amendment but as a roundabout way of protecting an
individual right to governmental services provided by the states and threatened by federal
action in the absence of a separate national commitment to the provision of such services by
officials accountable to local constituencies. For an argument that an individual right to
essential services might be implied by the Constitution, see also Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969). But
both Tribe, supra at 1092, and Michelman, States' Rights, at 1178, 1183, admit that any
judicial effort to enforce the right to essential services would encounter great difficulties.
Thus, even if one were to accept their claim that one of the main functions of federalism is to
assure the provision of services to individuals, it would be more appropriate to view Tribe's
and Michelman's defense as a second-order theory of federalism, rather than an argument for
the existence of an individual right to essential services.
104
105
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the functions assigned to it by the Constitution. And it is very
much in this light that, in the wake of the Garcia decision, we
should look at the function of the states within the federal system.

IV.

THE FUNCTION OF THE STATES WITHIN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM

Having developed the general idea of process jurisprudence
endorsed in the Garcia case, I shall now move to a more concrete
discussion of the functions assigned to the states in our constitutional system. My purpose is not to come up with some entirely
new rationale behind the federal structure of American government, but rather to examine its oft-mentioned justifications in the
light of the process-oriented approach and to clarify the way in
which federalist institutions were designed to serve the fundamental values envisaged in the Constitution. What will, I hope, emerge
from my discussion is that the intellectual agenda endorsed in the
Garcia case, when properly carried out, is by no means inimical to
the protection of the integrity of state political processes recognized
in National League of Cities, despite the seemingly contradictory
holdings in these two cases. In examining the most important functions of the states within the federal system, we should keep in
mind the two prongs of inquiry necessary to bring out the full
implications of Garcia: the identification and analysis of the political
processes by which federalism protects important constitutional
values and the identification of potential failures or shortcomings in
the national political process which may endanger the vital role of
the states in the constitutional scheme.
A. TYRANNY PREVENTION

1. Governmental pathologies and the role of the states. Perhaps the
most frequently mentioned function of the federal system is the one
it shares to a large extent with the separation of powers, namely,
the protection of the citizen against governmental oppression-the
"tyranny" that the Framers were so concerned about.
The fear expressed rather generally at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution was that the central government, ruling over a
large territory and population, would be far removed from the
people and would rely on a caste of bureaucrats and politicians,
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wielding an enormous governmental machine that could be turned
against the interests of individuals and used to build a Romanlike
empire. 106 The odds of such a turn of events did not appear inconsiderable in light of historical experience. The history of Rome
was, after all, not a bad analogy. Like the American colonies, Rome
was essentially a small country when the republican system was
installed. Like America, the republican Rome was a rapidly expanding country, with respect to both territory and population.
The new wealth, the need for an enormous military and administrative machine, the disintegration of traditional communities and
of the old class structure, the rapid growth of external cultural
influences-all these factors, which were ultimately responsible for
the decay of the Roman Republic and the birth of the Empire, also
seemed a fair prospect for the United States. More recent, and
equally unhappy, experience was also available-since in all European countries (except for England) in which governmental centralization had been successfully accomplished, its concomitant was
the development of absolutist royal authority. Finally, shortly after
the adoption of the Constitution, the experience of the French
Revolution, with its bloody transition to the Napoleonic system,
provided quick confirmation of the possible dangers of centralized
authority.
As I have explained, 107 the Framers did not believe that a bill of
rights was a sufficient guarantee against the danger of "tyranny,"
and they insisted in the first place on institutional rather than individual-rights-oriented solutions. Some of these institutional arrangements were quite specific, such as the provision for civilian
control of the military, 108 but most had a more general purpose of
fragmenting governmental authority and of creating special interest
groups. In this category, next to the separation of powers, federalism plays the most important role.

106 Bailyn et al., The Great Republic 335-36 (1977); Storing, What the Anti-Federalists
Were For 15-23 (1981). For the hold of antiquity on the Revolutionary generation, see Wood,
note 34 supra, at 48-53.
107 See text preceeding note 97 supra.
108 Art. I, Section 8, prohibits appropriation of money to raise and support armies for a
longer term than two years; Art. II, Section 2, makes the President Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces; Art. I, Section 6 prohibits persons holding office under the United States
to be members of either House of the Congress or (per Art. II, Section I) presidential
electors.
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There are three somewhat different scenarios of governmental
oppression that the Framers seem to have had in mind when they
spoke of the danger of "tyranny." First, they were clearly concerned that a small minority might be oppressed by a sufficiently
homogeneous majority. Second, they were concerned with the
danger that a few powerful minority interests might gain ascendancy over the political process and exploit the rest of society. And
third, they were afraid that a powerful central government may
itself develop its own separate interest and oppress the citizenry.
With respect to the first two scenarios, Madison, the most profound and influential thinker among the Framers, believed that the
very size of the population subject to the national government made
it less likely that oppression would result. 109 Madison's point was
rather straightforward: if you increase the number of people involved, there will be a greater variety of interests and, consequently, a lesser chance of one faction acquiring a monopoly on
political power or of a sufficiently large number of interests entering into a viable and stable coalition. At first sight, Madison's reasoning is not without problems, especially in the light of some
modern developments. There is a rather old argument that in a
large state a great number of people are removed from direct participation in politics and that the absence of active citizenship
makes great masses of people susceptible to political demagoguery. 110 Whatever the historical truth of this observation, it seems to
acquire additional support in the light of the more recent phenomenon of "mass society." If it is indeed true that technological progress is a great leveler and that it eliminates a great number of
traditional, regional, and professional differences among people,
then the resulting uniformity, unknown in the smaller societies of
old, may contradict Madison's optimistic reliance on the diversity
of factions in a large state. Nevertheless, the public goods theory
comes to shore up the Madisonian point to some extent. In a large
society, regardless of the uniformity of interests, there is a lesser
chance that any one interest large enough to aspire to the monopoly
of power can achieve an effective level of organization. Since the
more numerous the interest group the more difficult and costly it is
The Federalist Papers, No. 10.
The argument goes as far back as Plato's Republic, 564c-566d. For a modern version,
see Sartori, Democratic Theory (1962).
109

110
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to organize, small interests have a natural advantage over large ones
and the "mass society" phenomenon is to some degree counteracted
by the very size of the masses involved. Thus, despite the perhaps
greater uniformity of modern societies, numerically small interest
groups that possess a high degree of cohesion or whose members
are easily identified are not particularly threatened by majoritarian
oppression. 111
If this were the whole story, one could say perhaps-along with
many liberal thinkers-that the primary means of preventing the
oppression of some interests by others consists not so much in
devising an elaborate structure of government as in making sure
that extragovernmental, social organisms are allowed to grow undisturbed and watch over each other. By simply assuring that the
access to the machine of government remains open to those who
want to influence its policies, one will then also assure that those
policies will reflect a wide range of interests and that no significant
majority will be systematically excluded from the benefits the government provides. By adopting the principle of majority rule,
therefore, one would in fact endorse the reality of genuine
pluralism.
But unfortunately, this is not the whole story, and the most
important complications arise because of the disparity between the
short- and long-term dynamics of social growth and because of the
role that the government itself can play in this development. While
the public-goods theory tells us that, all things being equal, small
interests are easier to organize than larger ones, it also tells us that
existing organizations have a definite advantage over still unorganized interests and that even originally weak organizations have a
tendency to grow and become stronger if they can devise mechanisms, such as a hierarchical structure, individualized incentives,

111 As Professor Ackerman has pointed out, note 71 supra, this indicates a serious flaw in
the argument, based on the Carotene Products footnote, that racial minorities deserve special
legal protection because they are "insular and discrete." While I do not, of course, wish to
imply that these minorities do not deserve special protection, their discreteness and insularity, given that it helps to assure their political representation, tends to argue against, rather
than for, such special solicitude. This might also be the reason why judicial protection of
individual rights is relatively effective in preventing the oppression of discrete minorities.
Given the difficulty of forming stable and cohesive majorities in a large society, oppression
of small, better organized groups is likely to be exceptional and sporadic. The courts, which
may have difficulties in resisting systematic majority policy, can, without undermining the
perception of their legitimate role, correct such sporadic excesses.
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and so on, to counteract the free-rider phenomenon. This, in turn,
means that the social structure of a large state tends, in the long
run, to ossify into a relatively small number of powerful interests
that come to dominate the political scene. 112 This phenomenon is
quite disturbing in itself since it undermines our confidence in the
ultimate representativeness of a government, which is in fact beholden to a few powerful interests. The phenomenom also decreases
the likelihood of needed reforms that may be in the general interest
of the community at large but not of those groups that are most
powerfully entrenched in the status quo. Even more disturbing is
the prospect that a small number of powerful interests may derive
their strength not so much from having their wishes disproportionately reflected in governmental policies as from using the machine
of government, specifically designed to defeat the free-rider phenomenon through its power to coerce, to reinforce their own internal cohesion or to prevent the competing interests from effective
organization.
But while the threat of the government's being used by a few
powerful interests (or perhaps even one) to oppress the rest of
society was very much in the minds of the Framers, of even more
importance in our own time is the third scenario of governmental
oppression they envisioned, that of the government itself becoming
the most powerful special interest, which can devour those whom it
is supposed to serve. 113 At any time, a government is more than a
merely passive vessel through which flows the diversity of private
interests. Like any large organization, it has many members who
have a special interest in their own position within the organization
as well as in the power of the organization itself. And while any
organization tends to develop its own institutional interests and
cohesion independent from the interest of the individuals it is supposed to represent, the more amorphous the organization's constituency the more likely is this tendency to grow. The government
machine, being very hierarchically structured, possessing an enormous ability to strengthen its own cohesion, having the most amor-

112 For the tendencies of social structures to ossify, see Olson, The Rise and Decline of
Nations: Economics and Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (1982).
113 For a view that this third scenario was also the most prominent in the thought of
Madison, see Carey, Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to Critics, 72
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 151 (1978).
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phous constituency of all (citizens in general), and having a virtual
monopoly on coercion, is more than likely, in the absence of other
centrifugal forces, to be a potential threat in any society. The threat
intensifies, however, when the traditional liberal policy of restricting the government to a few limited tasks is no longer feasible and
the expansion of the "activist state" is necessary to accomplish a
whole gamut of tasks that can no longer be entrusted to an unregulated private sector. Not only does the government then become a
primary dispenser of some of the most valuable resources 114 but
also the variety of competing private interests, on which the liberal
model so heavily depended for the prevention of governmental
oppression, becomes increasingly dependent on government policies for their survival and subject to often minute governmental
regulation. 115 One needs no reminder of the horrors of totalitarianism to realize the dangers that this process entails if the wheels of
the modern governmental machine were to turn against the individual members of the community.
How is federalism related to the Framers' objective of preventing
the three-headed specter of tyranny? Many American liberals tend
to look with skepticism on the states as the protectors of individual
freedom and they point to a whole host of situations in which the
states, much more than the federal government, have engaged in
practices violative of individual rights. Quite apart from the special
problem of racial discrimination, which is historically tied to the
regional character of slavery in the United States, there are in fact
good reasons to believe that the states represent a more direct threat
than the national authorities to the rights of small minorities and
that the states have only a secondary role to play in protecting such
minorities-so long as these minorities are not geographically
defined. The explanation for this lies in the fact that local constituencies are much more homogenous and cohesive than the national one, both because their members share more common interests and values and because, the constituencies being less numerous, stable majoritarian interests are more likely to exist within

114 For the role of the government-dispensed largesse and the concomitant transformation
of the type of resources on which the livelihood of individuals depends in contemporary
America, see Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
115 For the role of the state in running the corporate America, see Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. I (1965).
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them and to be easier to organize. Consequently, at least insofar as
the first of the Framers' scenarios of governmental oppression is
concerned, state governments are more likely than the national one
to be captured by powerful majoritarian interests and to oppress
small minorities with little power to resist. In this light, the Civil
War Amendments, with their emphasis on the federal protection of
individual rights, acquire a justification independent of the particular circumstances of their adoption. For the federal government,
being less likely to be dominated by one majoritarian interest,
seems better suited than any political forces within the average state
to guarantee the basic equality of treatment to state citizens (most
commonly by the enforcement of the federal Bill of Rights). 116
But if the liberal mistrust of the states' power is partially justified
in this way, the more comprehensive neglect on the part of liberals
of the importance of the states for the prevention of governmental
oppression is somewhat myopic. To begin with, while the states
are more easily captured by relatively undifferentiated majoritarian
interests intent on suppressing small minorities, the federal government may be a more likely subject of capture by a set of special
minoritarian interests, precisely because the majority interest of the
national constituency is so large, diffuse, and enormously difficult
to organize. The problem that this raises is not only that those
particular interests that are shared by the majority (such as the
interest of the consumers, for example) may be systematically underrepresented on the federal level, for there may be few such
interests in a country as diverse as the United States. A more
disturbing prospect is that the ossification of the social structure
may result in a virtual exclusion of quite a large number of diverse
interests that suffer under all kinds of organizational disadvantages
but which together constitute a majority the federal government is
supposed to serve. And here the existence and vitality of local
governments may provide an important counterbalance to the constellation of forces on the national level.
It is quite easy to see how a system weighted in favor of local
interests (either through the importance of state institutions or
through a regional representation on the national level) will provide
116 It is significant in this context that the federal action under the Fourteenth Amendment
was not subject to the limitations imposed in the National League of Cities on the exercise of the
Commerce Clause powers. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
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an institutional support to geographically defined groups that may
be subject to exclusion or exploitation by the more powerful regions. But it is no less important to see that the existence of a strong
system of local government may also modify those divisions between the potential ins and outs that are essentially social in nature
(such as between the traditional and new industries, organized and
unorganized labor, producers and consumers, and so on) rather
than primarily geographically determined. As I have noted, the
very scale on which an organization must succeed before it gains
meaningful access to the political process and can use the machine
of the government to improve its position vis a vis other groups is
very often decisive with respect to whether an effective collective
action takes place. It is thus quite likely that an effort to exclude
certain groups may be more successful on the federal than on the
state level and that maintaining the domination of an already existing power elite is much more difficult on the local level. Insofar,
then, as a large proportion of governmental benefits is dispensed on
an independent local level or as the constellation of forces on the
local level determines the influence on the national level, the danger
of minoritarian oppression is significantly diminished.
A simple example 117 may bring this out. Suppose that an existing
union movement, which is very well entrenched on the federal
level, is committed to supporting traditional industries, where its
leadership has the greatest power base, and systematically neglects
the interests of a newer type of employee, mostly white collar and
working in the service sector. In a situation of this kind, the likelihood of successful organization of the white-collar workers is rather
small, even on the local level, if the only reward to be expected is a
certain measure of influence over one or two federal politicians. If,
however, independently of any influence on the federal level, a
local white-collar organization can expect to influence in a significant manner a great number of state legislators, then the possibility
of effective collective action increases because the resulting state
legislation will immediately deliver tangible benefits to the new
union as well as strengthen its organizational status (by, for example, outlawing some employer practices or allowing closed-shop
117 In elaborating this example, I want to make a general point. I will consequently ignore
the complexities that would be introduced if one were to consider the impact of actually
existing federal labor legislation.
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contracts). Given this incentive modification, it is much more likely
that the new union will be successful in an increasing number of
states and ultimately will make itself felt on the national level.
There are at least three important lessons that may be drawn
from this example. First, the existence of effective local authorities
is an independent factor in allowing certain vital interests to organize. Second, the health of the national government crucially depends on the preservation of those local authorities, for otherwise
the national government is much more seriously threatened with
ossifying into a mouthpiece of a few powerful special interests. And
third, if federal legislators are primarily tied to the constituencies
that elect them (that is, in practice, to the already-often nationally-organized interest groups in their districts), then they do not
have any special incentive to strengthen the state governmental
machinery which may be the most important factor in readjusting
the local configuration of forces that in turn influences the actions of
the national representatives. In fact, the already established national interests, threatened by their new competitors on the local
level, may look to their still unbroken power on the national level to
remove their competition by a federal preemption mechanism or by
causing the national authorities to interfere with the state governmental operations and prevent the victory of their opponents on the
local level. 118
But the most influential protection that the states offer against tyranny is the protection against the special interest of the government itself. For the fact that the federal government may be less
likely than the states, in what we may call "normal times," to
oppress small minorities whose mode of life offends a homogeneous
majority does not mean that it is never likely to oppress them as
well as to deprive the citizenry as a whole of their legitimate voice
in running the national affairs. Should the federal government ever
be captured by an authoritarian movement or assert itself as a
special cohesive interest, the resulting oppression would almost
certainly be much more severe and durable than that of which any
state would be capable. In such a situation, both private individuals
and private-interest groups prepared to defend their rights would
face very grave organizational obstacles and could not provide any118 See Elliott, Ackerman, & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of En\'ironmental Law, 1 J. L. Econ. Org. 313 (1985).
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thing even approaching in effectiveness the resistance that may be
offered by a governmental institution, endowed with the power of
coercing those who may lack a sufficient individual motivation to
contribute (if even only financially) to the common good. It is
precisely because the states are governmental bodies that break the
national authorities' monopoly on coercion that they constitute
the most fundamental bastion against a successful conversion of the
federal government into a vehicle of the worst kind of oppression. 119
Viewed from this perspective, freedom from federal interference
enjoyed by state governmental machinery, and especially by those
of its organs that potentially provide the easiest means by which the
citizenry can organize itself against a tyrannical movement on the
national level, turns out to be a value quite independent from any
limitation of the federal power to regulate any substantive field
of private activity. While traditional liberal doctrine relied quite
heavily on the exclusion of government from most private activities
and hoped to guard us in this way from tyrannical overreaching,
the realization of the pervasiveness of market failures in a complex,
advanced society has made the doctrine of laissezfaire of less use
under modern conditions. Similarly, the increasing interdependence of social and economic problems on the national scale makes

119 Despite all the differences between the American and German federal systems, an
interesting lesson supporting our conclusions may perhaps be drawn from the experiences of
Germany around the time of the Nazi takeover. In post-Bismarckian Germany, the state of
Prussia constituted two-thirds of Germany's territory and three-fifths of its population, and it
had its own police force of close to 90,000 men. In 1932, when the Nazi threat was very clear
and the German Right embarked on its fateful policy to tame Hitler-the policy that was
ultimately to lead to the Nazi seizure of power-the Prussian government was controlled by
the Social Democrats intent on entrenching their own power and keeping the Nazis from
taking over. Faced with this, the Right, which controlled the central, Reich, government,
placed Prussia under martial law, removed the state government, and appointed a special
Reich Commissioner to rule by decree. The Prussian government appealed the constitutionality of this move and, after a celebrated trial, the Staatsgerichtshof, despite an apparently
Solomonic ruling, failed to preserve the Prussian autonomy. As a consequence, the
confidence in Weimar institutions was drastically undermined, the Social Democrats lost the
real control of Prussia, and a few months later the Prussian police, under the control of
Hermann Goering, was instrumental in the Nazi intimidation of political opposition and
enabled Hitler to establish himself as a dictator in Germany. One of his first acts was to
destroy the remaining state governments. For the account of the trail, see Bendersky, Carl
Schmitt-Theorist for the Reich, 175ff. (1983); for the whole episode, see Grund, "Preussenschlag" und Staatsgerichtshof im Jahre 193 2 (197 6); for its effect on the Weimar Republic,
see Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 214-15 (1964); for the lessons drawn by Germany
after World War II, see Fromme, Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz,
Tuebinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik, 142-43 (1960).
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it unrealistic to expect that the federal government can be kept
away from regulating the ever increasing details of what had previously been thought to be essentially local activities. In this situation, when it is no longer an option simply to resist most forms of
federal involvement in the private sector, the federalist idea of the
separation of the national and local governmental institutions acquires more, and not less, significance for the prevention of governmental oppression. 12 For the independence of the very process of
state government, without seriously hampering the national authorities in regulating most private activities, assures the existence
of an organizational framework, more efficient than any private
institution could provide, that may always be used as an effective
tool for bringing together otherwise defenseless individuals with
some stakes in resisting the overreaching of the national government. The value of this organizational apparatus thus lies not so
much in any of its concrete regulatory activities that the national
government could not do as well (or better), as in the very fact that
it eliminates the national monopoly on the power to coerce. Moreover, it is this feature of the federal system that distinguishes it
most clearly from other forms of decentralization. An intelligently
structured unitary national government can probably accommodate
the need for local experimentation by giving its local branches a
degree of discretion in applying national policies. Such a government may also perhaps draw on local talent or involve many local
interests in the formulation of the national policy. But only in a
system in which some forms of governmental authority exist independently from one another, and not as emanations from a single
source of legitimate power, is the monopoly on coercion truly broken. It seems not unreasonable therefore to see this break as the
essence of the American federal system and to acknowledge its

°

120 The vertical separation characteristic of the federalist system may become e\·en more
important under modern conditions, given the e\'olution of the separation of powers on the
national le\'el. For the complexity of the national go\·ernment's task in contemporary
America necessitates a far greater degree of cooperation between the three branches of the
national government and often requires that the day-to-day task of regulation be conferred on
a whole host of agencies that combine legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.
Without denying the continued importance of maintaining the constitutional lines of di\·ision
between the three branches as well as those between the federal go\'ernment and the states,
the tendency of all go\'ernmental institutions to interlock requires an increasingly fine tuning
of the constitutional theory to presen·e the balance required to a\'oid gm·ernmental oppression. In this situation, the continued neglect of the federalist ideas among constitutional
lawyers may be more dangerous today than e\'er before.
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constitutional status, not subject to the vagaries ordinary political
arrangements.
2. The failures of national representation. The idea that the independence of state political processes is an essential feature of American
federalism was, of course, at the heart of National League of Cities,
although it was largely obfuscated by being draped in the mantle of
state sovereignty. And, despite the explicit overruling of National
League of Cities by Garcia, the recognition of the states' role in preventing governmental oppression can not only withstand, but is in
fact strengthened, by the process-oriented analysis endorsed in
Garcia. The extent, however, to which a judicial enforcement of
federalist concerns can be incorporated into the Garcia rationale
depends on how the Court will interpret Garcia's focus on failures of
the political processes at the national level as the exclusive justification of any future judicial intervention. 121
What is exactly meant by a "process failure" that Garcia makes
into a condition of judicial intervention? The easiest answer would
be to say that the national political process functions flawlessly,
from the constitutional point of view, when the states' formal role
in choosing the national representatives (their role in the Senate, in
drawing the boundaries of Congressional districts, or in choosing
Presidential electors) is not impaired, and that only such an impairment would give grounds for judicial intervention. But this answer-which would simply amount to a repudiation of judicial
responsibility in the area of federalism-would represent a very
poor application of process jurisprudence, unless one were also to
show that there could be no other features of the national political
process that could seriously endanger the constitutional function of
the states within the federal system. In fact, however, it is rather
easy to show that there are very serious incentives built into the
very system of national representation that would make the exclusive reliance on the mere composition of the national government
for the protection of the states' tyranny-prevention functions quite
misplaced. A brief analysis will bring this to light.
The tyranny-prevention functions of state governments that we
have identified are, roughly, three (in increasing order of import121 "Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers ... must be
tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process." 105 S.Ct. at
1019-20.
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ance): the protection of geographically defined minorities; the facilitation of the expression of those interests that face organizational
disadvantages if they have to succeed on a very large scale; and the
provision of an organizational framework for resisting a wholesale
attack on individual freedoms by the federal government. The
question then is whether the role assigned to the states in the composition of the national government is by itself sufficient to prevent
those forms of federal interference with state governmental processes that may impede the states in performing the three functions
identified.
The least problematic aspect of concentrating on the composition
of the federal government is the reliance on the local representation
on the federal level for the protection of geographically defined
interests. Even if state governments were not available to give expression to such interests, the American system of representation,
unlike proportional representation or the British party system,
makes the link between a representative and his district into the
strongest determinant of his voting behavior. 122 But already with
respect to the facilitation of the expression of those interests that are
not local in nature, but which may face organizational obstacles if
they must succeed over wide geographical areas, the simple fact of
local districting will likely not suffice for those interests to make
themselves heard. For, as I have argued earlier, 123 large and wellestablished interests have a definite advantage on the national level,
and it is primarily the possibility of using state governmental machinery as a counterweight to the federal government that gives the
less well-organized interests their fighting chance. It is therefore
not only insufficient for newer interests to count on their capture of
a few national representatives to realize their goals but also there are
good reasons to believe that the very challenge by newer interests
on the local level provides an incentive for the older interests to use
their influence on the federal level in order to weaken state governments and thus to disarm their opponents.
This does not mean, of course, that the state governmental ma122 For studies of the determinants of congressional voting see Mayhew, Congress: The
Electoral Connection (1974); Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (1973);
Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (1973); Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence
in Congress, 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 45 (1963).
123 See text supra at note 112. See in particular the example gi,·en in text following note 117
supra.
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chinery, with its capacity to propel aspiring politicians to power or
its ability to influence the shape of congressional districts, does not
have a considerable impact on the behavior of national politicians.
Nevertheless, ever since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of Senators), and in particular
during the last thirty years, there has been a marked decrease in the
dependence of the national representatives on the processes of local
governments and an increase in their reliance on both national and
local private interests. 124 There is also, perhaps not accidentally, a
radical increase in the federal government's tendency to regulate
the states themselves, either through a system of commands or
conditional spending, which makes the very operations of state
governments increasingly dependent on federal decisions. 125 Faced
with this situation, it would be quite fatuous to rely on the mere
composition of the federal government as a sufficient defense
against a minoritarian ossification on the national level.
Many of the same reasons counsel against the hope that the mere
composition of the federal government would protect the states in
their role of providing an organizational framework for resisting a
potential tyranny by the federal government itself. To be sure, the
primary constituencies of the national representatives, along with
most of the citizenry, probably have an interest in preventing authoritarian oppression, and, in extraordinary circumstances of a
direct authoritarian assault on the constitutional system, those national representatives who might be inclined to resist would also try
to lean on state governments for support. But it is also the case that
in nprmal times, in which most of the pressure to erode the independence of the states is exerted, the primary constituencies of the
national representatives may, as we have seen, be precisely those
that advocate an extension of the federal power to the disadvantage
of the states. As one scholar observed, "[N]o one expects Congress
to obliterate the states in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it

124 See Kaden, note 78 supra, at 857-68. Among the factors listed by Kaden as influencing
this change are: the role of mass media, the decreasing role of the states in shaping electoral
districts, the increasing importance of incumbency, the decreasing role of the party machine,
the changes in campaign financing, and the increasing role of the federal government.
125 For a review of this process as well as the empirical studies of it, see ACIR, Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform (1984). The ruling of National league of
Cities, when still in effect, had only a limited impact of this tendency. Id. at 38ff.
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lies in the tyranny of small decisions. " 126 which may over time
remove the states as a force to reckon with in the national politics
and prepare the ground for a tyrannical assault. It is thus clear that
the national government, even when it operates "normally" and the
states' role in its composition is not impaired, is capable of endangering the values underlying the federalist system. But if in all this
the national government operates "normally," in what sense can a
judicial defense of state interests still be viewed as correcting for a
"failure" of the national process, rather than as imposing an external constraint on this process (a constraint rooted, for example, in
the Tenth Amendment)?
I have said 127 that it does not strike me as extremely important
whether the constitutional protection of federalism is textually
rooted in the Tenth Amendment or in the main body of the Constitution. What is more important is that it be anchored in a comprehensive theory of the governmental processes set up by the
Constitution and that it provide intelligible standards of adjudication. But with this caveat, it is by no means inappropriate to speak
of a "failure" of the national government when its operation undermines the constitutional role of the states. The primary reason for
saying this is that, in undermining the states, the federal government at the same time undercuts those very features of the national
political process as a whole (both on the state and national level) on
which its own health crucially depends. To repeat, the main thrust
of the states' tyranny-prevention function is to guard against the
minoritarian ossification of the national government and the possibility of its tyrannical degeneration. On both these counts, the very
representativeness of the federal government and its own robustness depends on whether the states are afforded adequate protection.
To be sure, the "process failure" that I have identified is not a
result of any simple "mistake" on the part of the Framers. It rather
reflects an inherent tension in our constitutional system between
the desire to assure the independence of the federal government
from the states and at the same time to preserve the states as vital
protectors against national overreaching. It was inadvisable to
strengthen the link between the federal representatives and the
126

Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).

127

See the text following note 78 supra.
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state governments, for this would impair the necessary power of
the national authorities, but it was also impossible to rely on the
composition of the national government as an exclusive remedy
against a federal assault on the states. Still, even if the composition
of the national government is inherently biased against important
interests of the states, it would be in the name of keeping the federal
political process open and healthy that the judiciary would oversee
its policies toward the states.
Finally, it should be noted that the more sophisticated concept of
process failure under examination is in full accord with the general
trend of American process jurisprudence. A comparison that comes
to mind would be a judicial decision to scrutinize closely an outcome of the political process that impairs the channels of communication necessary for its own future health or discriminates against
minorities that face organizational obstacles in getting a fair share of
governmental benefits. In both these cases, as in the case of a
federal action endangering the states, it would be impossible to say
that, as long as the formal requirements of representation are satisfied, the courts should stay out of the conflict because the process
did not fail. For in all such cases, the responsible governmental
authorities-designed to fulfill a great variety of tasks and not
geared to any one of them exclusively-may occasionally fail with
respect to an aspect of their constitutional mission. It is to be hoped
therefore that Garcia's focus on the political process at the federal
level will not be misunderstood and undermine its promise of a new
jurisprudence of federalism. 128
B. PROVIDING A SPACE FOR PARTICIPATORY POLITICS

The value of citizen participation in governmental operations has
often been stressed in legal literature and its enhancement has often
128 Garcia itself clearly accepts the possibility that the process failure required for judicial
intervention may be of the kind we have identified, for its statement that "[a]ny substantive
restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers ... must be tailored to compensate for
possible failings in the national political process" is made in response to (and acknowledgment of) the argument that the "changes in the structure of the Federal Government ...
since 1789, not the least of which ... the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment ... may
work to alter the influence of the States in the federal political process." 105 S.Ct. at 101920. If the only cognizable process failure were to consist in depriving the states of their
formal representation required by the Constitution, it would be, of course, impossible to
argue that the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (which is an integral part of the
Constitution) could lead to any process failure in this restrictive sense.
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been viewed as one of the most important purposes of federalism. 129
But the objectives of citizen participation are usually seen as clustered around such things as the facilitation of the flow of information between the citizens and the government, improving the
efficiency of governmental decisions, and the enhancement of the
accountability of public officials or of the public acceptance of governmental decisions. 130 Viewed in this way, citizen participation
appears, above all, as a means of strengthening the representativeness of governmental institutions and enhancing the perception
of its legitimacy. 131 This view has much to recommend it and fits
quite well with the general inclination of the proponents of process
jurisprudence to focus on the role of undistorted representation for
the expression of the will of the majority; nonetheless, the view
ignores the independent significance of citizen participation that
may have been one of the controlling considerations in the Framers'
thinking about federalism. In this context, citizen participation is
understood as a separate process of direct self-government, quite
distinct from the very idea of representative democracy.
l. Representation-enhancing participation. Even in arguing that citizen participation strengthens and legitimizes the representativeness
of governmental institutions-that is, in viewing participation primarily as a means rather than the end of political life-the legal
literature remains most often at a common-sense, largely anecdotal
level of analysis that tends to ignore much of other disciplines'
(above all, political science's) learning on the subject and is likely to
miss some of the less obvious problems with its arguments. 132 The
129 See, e.g., FERC v. !\lississippi, 456 C.S. 742, 789 (1982)(opinion ofO'Connor,J.). For
the most extensive treatment in legal literature, see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Citizen Participation in the American Federal System (1979) (hereafter
cited as ACIR, Citizen Participation).
130 See, e.g., ACIR, Citizen Participation, at 2, 62-64.
"' It is in this way that the concept of participation functions in Ely's version of the
process theory. Ely defines the goals of participation as those of the "broadened access t~ the
processes and bounty of representative government." Ely, note 70 supra, at 74. See also 1d. at
75, footnote. An exception to such an instrumental view of participation in legal literature
may be found in Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. l057 (1980).
132 The level of sophistication of the legal literature on the subject is not, however, uniformly low. Thus, for example, the ACIR study on Citizen Participation, while making little
use of the more theoretical sources, contains a wealth of interesting data and insightful
analyses. But no effort is made in the ACIR study to relate this to the constitutional
dimension of federalism. The constitutional problems of federalism are to some extent
addressed in another ACIR study, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and
Reform ( 1984), but with little attention to the issue of participation.
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operative assumption in most of these discussions is, again, that
the government should serve the interests of the people and that the
"closer" it remains to the people, the better it is likely to succeed.
Citizen participation being the method of involving the people directly in the affairs of the government, it must be a good idea.
Undoubtedly, there is much truth in these observations but also
much that is problematic. Even if we do not question the assumption that the interest of the "people" is ultimately identical to the
interest of individuals, 133 it is by no means clear that individuals
themselves are best able to articulate the types of considerations
that will most affect their interests or identify the decisions that will
maximize them. 134 In fact, one of the basic tenets of the classical
theory of representation is that it is both wasteful and dangerous for
the masses to busy themselves with the complex matters of policy
making that may be better handled by professional politicians who
choose this as their full-time occupation. 135 Naturally, a certain
element of outside control on the political process is necessary for
preventing its authoritarian degeneration, but what the required
level of such control is and who will best exercise it are matters of
considerable complexity. While there is not much controversy
among political scientists that the electoral process plays an important role in this respect, 136 even on this score there is much evidence
that the extent of popular participation in elections is not necessarily a sign of the government's political health or legitimacy. 137
There are also persuasive arguments that too much electoral control
may in some situations unproductively divert the efforts of the
legislators 138 or make them systematically ignore those issues that
133 For the problematic nature of the concept of the "people," see, e.g., Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 250ff. (1947).
134 Ibid.
135 See Mill, Essays on Politics and Culture, 17 (Himmelfarb ed.) (l 963); see also Sartori,
Democratic Theory (1962) (although Sartori may misrepresent the "classical" theory, his
own view is very much in point). Cf Lippmann, Public Opinion 25 lff. (l 965 ed.); Schumpeter, note 128 supra, at 295; Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion
Formation in a Presidential Campaign 314-15 (1954).
136 See Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, passim, but esp. at l25fL (1956).
137 Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 216-19. Chapter VI, at 179-219,
contains a wealth of data on this issue. These data are not entirely unambiguous and do not
mean, of course, that disenfranchisement, as opposed to actual nonparticipation, does not
lead to the neglect of the interests that cannot make themselves felt at the polls.
138 For evidence that Congressmen spend a staggering portion of their time on reelection
concerns, see Mayhew, Congress. The Electoral Connection (1974), passim.
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do not provide an immediate payoff at the polls-even though they
may have an ultimately greater impact on the electorate's welfare. 139 Moreover, many electoral systems that seemingly provide a
more adequate and more direct representation to a greater variety
of interests in fact lead to less governmental stability, decreased
efficiency, and shakier long-term legitimacy. 14 Finally, it is not
difficult to conceive of situations in which a competent bureaucrat,
operating in a clear hierarchical structure in which he expects to
make his career, may do a much better job at serving the public
than a politician directly responsible to the electorate. 141
If even with respect to the electoral process, the degree of citizen
participation is subject to much controversy, there are still more
serious doubts as to other forms of citizen involvement. The basic
problem with many forms of direct citizen involvement is that
while we may accept the individuals' welfare as the ultimate object
of good government, the identification of the "people" with the sum
of the individuals composing it is too simplistic. In the same way as
I have argued that only the proper appreciation of the special role of
political and governmental institutions can allow us to understand
the design of our constitutional system, 142 it can also be argued that
the extragovernmental social fabric crucially depends on a variety
of structures or processes that may have a more or less concrete
institutional existence but which all have their own interests and
claims that must be taken into account. Unions, corporations,
churches, families, educational institutions, consumer organizations, and others simply cannot be reduced to the individuals who
compose them for the very reason they are often formed is because
the interests they represent and the functions they fulfill cannot be
adequately pursued by uncoordinated individuals. 143 One of the
most influential trends in political science has been to think of

°

Ibid. See also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
Lipset, note 137 supra, at 45-46, 179ff.
141 Lawyers often make arguments of this kind against the elective judiciary. But the
problem is equally apparent in other areas and does not depend only on the need for
expertise. See also text at note 17 5 infra.
142 See Part 111.B.2 supra.
143 We have considered the reasons whv institutions are necessary for the achievement of
public goods. See text at notes 101-3 ·supra. A classic work e~plaining the particular
significance of the institutions mentioned in the text is Tocqueville's Old Regime and the
French Revolution (1955).
139

140
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society as a collection of groups, rather than of individuals, vying
for political influence, and it is the pressure of those groups that is
often seen as the most effective form of outside control of governmental abuse. 144 But if this view is seriously considered, the problem of assuring the representativeness of political institutions is by
no means solved by uncritically striving for increased citizen participation. For while some forms of outside influence and control
(and hence participation) must be assured for the government to be
legitimately representative, it is clear that the direct involvement of
individual citizens is not always, or even most often, the best way
of achieving this. It would be at least not surprising if many of the
basic institutional concerns, on which the individuals' welfare ultimately depends, were to be in fact neglected or diluted within the
framework of directly participatory politics.
2. Participation as an independent value. All the foregoing complexities concerning the relation between participation and representation are no more than that-complexities that must be taken into
consideration, but that do not in a wholesale fashion invalidate the
idea that citizen participation has an important role to play in the
process of representative democratic politics and that the governmental decentralization characteristic of the American federal system may be one of the principal constitutional means of assuring
the desired level of citizen involvement. But in order to transform
this idea into a full-fledged argument, the legal profession would
have to conduct a much more detailed inquiry into the way in
which the political institutions set up by the Constitution are supposed to accommodate the participatory elements of the political
process and to establish how the Constitution resolves the tension
between the disruptive and the constructive aspects of participation
in a representative democratic system.
While the task just mentioned is beyond the ambitions of this
paper, citizen participation may also be viewed quite independently from the mechanics of representation. This view is directly
related to the ideas of federalism.
The model of representative politics rests on the idea that the
main task of political institutions consists in providing a method of
selecting a social policy that reflects in a fair and acceptable manner
144 See, e.g., Truman, The Governmental Process (1951); Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist
Democracy (1982).
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the preferences and interests of those groups or individuals who are
members of a given political society. 145 What is distinctive in this
model is its essentially atomistic conception of society in which the
basic interests of social actors do not derive from their being members of the political community and in which the government
serves an essentially instrumental function of aggregating the actors' primary preferences into social policies.
Against this representative model, the model of participatory
government, which goes as far back as Aristotle, views political
activity not as instrumental toward achieving a proportionate share
in the distribution of available resources, to be used in a variety of
private pursuits, but rather as a good in itself, something essentially
implicated in the very concept of human freedom. This way of
thinking, which stresses the role of the community in the very
shaping of the "interests" of its members and in infusing their lives
with a sense of purpose, was by no means absent from the thought
of the Founding Fathers. To be sure, the Framers were very
strongly influenced by the liberal theories of Locke and de Montesquieu, which placed a high value on the individualistic ideal of
liberty understood as freedom from politics that would allow men
to focus on the private pursuit of happiness and salvation. This,
and the Founders' realization of the difficulty of devising meaningful and workable participatory institutions in a modern society,
operating on a very large, national scale, are clearly responsible for
their choice of the representative model as, by and large, the most
appropriate form of government on the federal level. As we have
seen, they also thought of the representative federal model as a way
of checking the potentially illiberal tendencies of the more homogenous political life on the local level (an area in which the federal
government has been particularly active since the adoption of the
Civil War Amendments)H6 and as a check on the danger of balkani-

145 For a comprehensive argument that the very concept of representation, so understood,
may be quite problematic on its own terms and that every widely used method of aggregating
individual preferences into social choices underdetermines the ultimate outcome and lends
itself to extensive manipulation, see the seminal work of Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (I 951). Arrow's work in turn gave rise to a very extensi,·e literature that has
unfortunately had only a minimal impact on the legal profession. For a review of some of that
literature, see Barry & Hardin, Rational Man and Irrational Society? (1982), Part II.
146 For a discussion of the differential impact of the state and federal authorities with
respect to the protection of individual rights, see text following note 115 supra.
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zation inherent in local autonomy. But it does not take very much
effort or perspicacity to notice that the Founding Fathers did not
look forward to a society reduced to atomistic pursuits of individual
well-being, nor did they, like many liberals, see the extragovernmental sphere of "civil society" (such as private associations,
churches, and interest groups) as the exclusive locus where the
social aspirations of individuals are realized. On the contrary, their
ever present concern with what they called public, civic, or "republican" virtue testifies clearly to their belief that the "good life," as
Aristotle would have termed it, involves a commitment to a political community and participation in a process by which individuals shape in common the mode of life they are going to share. Not
only is it not unlikely that the Framers were familiar with the
extremely influential work of Rousseau and not only did they aspire
to recreate some of the features and glory of the ancient republics
(which had relied much more on participation than representation)
but also the most indigenous American political tradition, especially but not exclusively in the North, was inextricably linked to
the idea of direct popular control over the matters involving the life
of each locality. 147 It should then be by no means surprising if,
given the limited possibility of direct participation on the national
level, the Framers envisaged the states, and particularly their subdivisions, as the most fertile ground for the development of the
alternative political processes, responsive to the need for participatory forms of political life. 148
The tie between the idea of federalism and that of preserving the
public space of participatory politics cannot, however, rely exclusively on the Framers' assumptions, but must also correspond to
the realities of contemporary American politics. Even a cursory
look at the modern political scene is enough to convince one that
state governments are very different from the Greek agora or the
forum of the early republican Rome and that representation is a
standard feature of each state's political life. There have even been
some arguments that it is the states, rather than the federal government, that have most interfered with those local bodies, such as
See Frug, note 13 I supra, at l095ff., and the sources cited therein.
The most radical expression of the Framers' endorsement of local participatory politics
may be found in Jefferson's famous proposal for the "ward system." See his letter to Samuel
Kercheval of July 13, 1816.
147
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municipal governments, in which participatory politics could still
be realistically envisaged in the modern world. H 9 Nevertheless,
these observations do not necessarily undermine the link between
federalism and participatory ideals.
First of all, if there is some genuine room for noninstrumental
participation in American political life, it can realistically exist only
on the local level. There have been some efforts to devise new
means, using modern communications technology, of reviving participatory politics on a large scale, 150 but the dominant view is that
the optimum size of a political body that can afford significant
citizen participation is nowhere near the size of the modern nation
state or even of its main provincial subdivisions. 151 Whatever else
may be obscure, it also seems clear that within our political structure, practically all the local political bodies that may be suitable for
the development of participatory politics function under the umbrellas of state governments. Even if these bodies are often hampered by state governments run on a representative model, the
remedy for this cannot come at the federal constitutional level
(though at the state level, constitutional as well as political solutions
may be sought). Thus, if the protection of the participatory political processes does indeed rise to the federal constitutional level, it
must take the form of limiting federal interference with the governmental operations run under the auspices of the states, although it
might be focused on checking particularly those forms of federal
action that interfere with the institutions run on the participatory
model. 152
Secondly, the existence of participatory politics on the state level
and on the level of state subdivisions is by no means a fiction. From

Frug, note 131 supra, at l059.
See Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a ;\'ew Age (1984), esp. at
261 et seq. and the sources cited therein.
151 See Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 953 (1967).
152 It might be noted in this context that however faulty was the identification of the
governmental processes protected by the rule of the National league of Cities, the immunity
established in that case was extended not only to the highest organs of state governments but
also to their local emanations, such as townships and municipalities. 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
Had the Court decided this issue primarily on the ground of state "so\·ereignty," it would
have been likely to track more closely the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which refused to extend sovereign immunity to the local units on the county and municipal le\·el. See
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1977); Lincoln County\'.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1980).
149
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a comprehensive study, based on a number of empirical surveys,
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 153
there emerges a picture of interlocking participatory institutions at
all levels of government, with a particular success on the local level.
To begin with, the study shows, the most traditional American
mechanism of participatory democracy-the town meeting-is
very much alive in a large section of the country, extending
significantly beyond New England. 154 The levels of attendance at
these meetings are quite high, especially where they have a
significant role in the budgetary process and school matters. Further, throughout the country, there is significant citizen involvement in the local planning process, school boards, the budget process, and other governmental functions. Among the techniques
used to foster participation are a set of hearing mechanisms, volunteer programs, conferences, opinion-polling mechanisms, open
meeting and records laws, drop-in centers, hot lines, as so on. 155
Finally, a special role of the most powerful tool of direct government on a larger scale-the referendum-must be mentioned. The
referendum exists in some form in forty-two states, of which thirtyeight allow referenda on the local level. Most of these states leave
room for citizen-initiated referenda, and in seventeen states the
state constitution may be amended through this process (other
states requiring citizen-approved conventions). In thirty-nine states
statutory laws are, or may be, subject to popular ratification. 156 In a
large measure, these referenda were designed (mostly during the
Progressive era) to permit direct citizen involvement in the governing process, and, in addition to allowing the bypassing of the representative system, offer an important incentive for the citizens to
keep abreast of the substantive issues in the political life of their
communities. While the federal government is by no means always
hostile to some forms of citizen participation, its own attempts at
creating more room for it are, by and large, much less successful
than the practices of the states and largely rely on the opportunities
provided by state institutions. 157
ACIR, Citizen Participation, passim, but see esp. chs. 3, 5.
Id. at 238-39. Town meetings are used in portions of twenty states, principally in New
England, mid-Atlantic and midwestern states.
155 Id., esp. at 65.
156 Id. at 247-49.
157 Id. at 3-6 and ch. 4.
153
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If one of the primary functions, within the federalist framework,
of state-run institutions is to provide the public space for participatory politics, then from this point of view federalism does not conceive the division between the state and national governments as a
way of parceling out "sovereignty"-the control over substantive
fields of regulation-but rather as a way of preserving alternative
modes of decision making. Naturally, the vitality of the participatory state institutions depends in part on the types of substantive
decisions that are left for the states. Should the federal government
preempt them from most fields that touch directly on the life of
local communities, the states would become but empty shells
within which no meaningful political activity could take place. But
whatever the effect of preemption, the principles of federalism provide an important and independent reason for protecting the autonomy of the political processes of local governments, and this not
just in the name of democratic control (for the federal government
is also subject to such control), but also in the name of protecting a
different form of political space that the national government is
very unlikely to provide.
Viewed from this perspective, federalism is not entirely of one
piece with liberal individualism and its ideology of privacy and
individual rights. 158 To be sure, the fear of national power, unchecked by local authority, was inextricably linked in the Framers'
mind with the fear of what they called "tyranny"; federalism, like
separation of powers, was one of the whole panoply of institutional devices to protect individual rights. 159 Yet it is not correct to
view federalism as nothing more than yet another expression of the
American commitment to pluralism. On the contrary, federalism
seems to be at least partially inspired by an ideal of a tightly knit
community of persons who share each other's values and concerns
and for whom politics does not resolve to a periodical exercise of
voting rights but rather stands for the most general expression of
their common aspirations. For this reason, it should come as no
surprise that throughout the course of postrevolutionary American
history the banner of "state rights" was more often than not raised
in opposition to the individualistic ideology of traditional liberal158 For a discussion of the conflict between liberalism and the idea of participatory democracy within our political system, see Frug, note 131 supra.
159 See supra, section IV A.
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ism. It was populism, rather than liberalism, as well as the defense
of a peculiar, provincial mode of life that found the ideology of
federalism useful and congenial. 160 This fact is more than a coincidence, for a protest against the centralization of political authority,
far from being a liberal monopoly, has been a standard feature of
most conservative as well as romantic or populist ideologies opposed to the impersonal character of modern states. 161 The Constitution is not an exclusively liberal product, however; its
greatness and durability may in fact lie in finding a way to accommodate a variety of values and political visions that have exploded
many other societies.
3. judicial enforcement. As in the case of the states' tyrannyprevention function, Garcia's focus on the national political process
makes the future of any judicial protection of the states' role as
providers of a space for participatory politics depend on whether it
can be conceptualized as a correction of some process failure on the
federal level. There is, again, no doubt that the structure of the
national government manifests an unavoidable and intentional bias
that makes it unlikely to do justice to the constitutional importance
of participatory politics. The federal government was clearly designed to channel the pluralist interest politics through a system of
representation, and its ability to accommodate the need for citizen
participation is quite limited. Insofar as participatory local institutions also have a representation-enhancing function and aid
in legitimizing governmental institutions in general, there is, of
course, some pressure on the national government to maintain
them. Also, as I have shown, 162 the different mechanics of representation on the state and national levels result in the two governments having different constituencies whose interests are, from
time to time, likely to clash. Consequently, the more established
interest groups, which are usually more influential on the national
level, may very well view favorably a federal policy of fostering
direct participatory institutions on the state level since that may
160 As opposed to the more explicitly political uses of federalism, the judicial enforcement
of state rights, in such cases as those cited in notes 43 and 44, was often viewed as motivated
by laissezfaire liberalism. See Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States' Rights (1936).
161 For a discussion of the dangers that the ideal of a tightly knit community may represent
for individual rights and the role of the federal government in protecting them, see text at
note 116 supra.
162 See text following note 116 supra and text at notes 122-26 supra.
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generally diminish the effectiveness with which any special interest
groups may use the state apparatus for their own purposes and thus
decrease the competition for the groups well entrenched on the
federal level. 163 But, on the whole, it would be too much to expect
that such factors would be enough to make the federal government
properly attuned to the needs of local participation. The requirements of long-term legitimacy are more than likely to be sacrificed
for the perceived efficiency of short-term measures inimical to local
autonomy. It is equally likely that an intermittent special-interest
pressure would result in federal solicitude for participatory citizen
involvement in the least appropriate aspects of local politics. 164
Consequently, the protection of the participatory processes of local
government must come in part at least from judicial supervision
over the outcomes of national politics.
It may be possible to characterize the inability of the national
political process to protect fully the participatory function of local
government as a "failure" of this process. It is much harder, however, to claim that the aim of scrutinizing the outcomes of the
national process in this area is to protect the health of the federal
government itself. Insofar as citizen participation can be said to
have a representation-enhancing role, an argument of this kind
could be quite persuasive. But insofar as citizen participation is an
independent constitutional value, it would be somewhat disingenuous to try to argue for it in the same way. An alternative justification would thus probably be more appropriate.
I have said that the federalist concern with state participatory
institutions is not of one piece with the liberal ideology underlying
other parts of the Constitution. There is, however, one point that
the two views share-the idea of limiting the sovereignty of the
national government in favor of the associational rights of individ-

163 This will be so because participation, understood as a form of direct self-government,
relies on an unimpeded access of individuals to the political process and thus dilutes the
advantage that any organized groups enjoy in a representative system. Thus, to go back to
my previous example, if the organizers of a new white-collar union hope to strengthen
themselves by capturing a state agency dealing with labor issues, the employers and the old
union can, by transforming the agency into a wide-open participatory institution (for example, through pressing the federal government to "open up the machine-dominated state
bodies") significantly lessen the agency's value to the new union. What this shows, incidentally, is that the states' participation-enhancing function may sometimes be in conflict with
their tyranny-prevention function.
164 See the immediately preceding note.
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uals. While it has been a rather common tendency in our legal
system to think of institutions on the model of individuals and to
neglect the peculiar character of collective entities, there is nevertheless a significant body of constitutional law derivatively protecting private associations from governmental interference that could
destroy those institutions. Liberals consider this jurisprudence to
be particularly important not only for aiding resistance to governmental oppression but also for leaving sufficient room for individuals to develop the forms of life they consider meaningful. Perhaps
because liberals have traditionally viewed governmental bodies as
playing no more than an instrumental role and because they usually
associated them with a threat to-rather than a forum for-the
realization of individual aspirations, no corresponding body of constitutional law has ever developed for the protection of the associational values that may inhere in public, governmental institutions,
especially when they are not protected by the usual mantle of state
sovereignty. Thus, if the shibboleth of state sovereignty is finally
discarded, as it should be, there is a distinct need to revitalize those
aspects of the Bill of Rights that may be used to protect the autonomy of state political processes. Whether such need may be best
accommodated through a reading of the First or the Tenth (or even
the Ninth) Amendment is not of particular importance. But an
additional benefit of doing this may be a development of a body of
law geared to the peculiar claims to process integrity that institutions in general could raise within our constitutional system, rather
than dealing with all limitations of national sovereignty through the
prism of individual rights.
If what I have said so far is accepted, then certain features of the
National League of Cities decision acquire a very special significance
not sufficiently brought out in that case. The rule formulated there
singles out the very integrity of the political processes of local governments as a value quite independent of any outcomes that these
processes generate, and the rationale of that rule need no longer
depend entirely on the type of protection of which only governmental institutions could avail themselves in the past. Instead, it
brings the federalist ideas within the general orbit of a theory of
limited representative government and points to the special role of
associational values in the political structure of American democracy. In this context, one of the basic purposes of federalism is to
assure that, insofar as politics is per se an indispensable communal
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component of the good life, the nationalization of political decision
making does not deprive the communities and individuals of an
essential sphere of their self-realization. Freedom to participate in
government, rather than freedom from government, is the issue at
stake. The meaning of some activity's being "local" does not lie in
its being "reserved for the states" or apt to be more efficiently
handled by a local authority but in the fact that, unlike most national issues, it is being handled by a participatory institution.
C. LABORATORIES OF EXPERIMENT

Courts as well as commentators are very fond of repeating Justice
Brandeis's dictum that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 165 While the
context of Justice Brandeis's remark had nothing to do with protecting the states from Congressional interference 166 and while his
point concerned only an "incident" of the federal system, the claim
that the states constitute "national laboratories of experiment" came
to be viewed by many as a cornerstone of the federalist thinking
and has quickly become one of the least examined verities of constitutional theory. Only recently has there been some scholarly
effort to assess the accuracy of this claim, 167 and the most that can
be said is that the jury is still out.
The importance attached by many to the states' function as laboratories of experiment is at least in part exaggerated and, in any
case, of little significance for constitutional adjudication. This is
true for three reasons. First, whether a strong protection of the
states' autonomy would actually contribute to the efficiency of the
American government is a very complex question that does not
admit of an easy answer. In fact, there are many arguments to the
contrary. Second, insofar as there is something to the laboratoryof-experiment argument, a unitary government could avail itself of
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (I 932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
At stake in Liebman was a due process claim by an individual against the state of
Oklahoma.
167 A list of the most important works on the subject may be found in Mashaw & RoseAckerman, Federalism and Regulation, in The Reagan Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment
111-52 (Eads & Fix eds.) (1984).
165

166

8)

FEDERAUSM

409

the same advantages by a partial delegation of authority to its local
branches, so that there may be nothing in the laboratory rationale
that is peculiarly related to the federal structure of American government. Finally, even if it turns out that decentralization does
contribute to governmental efficiency, the analysis necessary to
determine which aspects of local governance should be protected
from central interference is of a very complex and largely pragmatic
nature and thus unsuitable either for elevation to the constitutional level or for judicial assessment. In sum, then, in developing
their federalist jurisprudence, the courts should concentrate on the
other, more fundamental state functions within the federal framework: the protection against tyranny and the provision of a space
for participatory politics.
We should begin with the observation that if the laboratory-ofexperiment argument were fully accepted, it would be hard to limit
its conclusions to the protection of the internal mode of state governmental operations, as proposed by National League of Cities, and
not to apply them to the states' control over the private sector.
After all, to take the facts of National League of Cities as an example,
the imposition of minimum-wage requirements for private hospitals reduces the possibility of state experimentation (to say nothing
of private experimentation) in this area no less than in the case of
public hospitals. Indeed, the very possibility of federal preemption
of the regulation of any field of private activity decreases the possibility of state-introduced innovation. Thus, unless we are seriously
prepared to consider reversing the long tradition of the Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and go back to the idea of preserving some
areas of exclusive state regulation, the laboratory-of-experiment argument proves too much. 168

168 It is, of course, possible to say that direct regulation of state governmental processes not
only affects the possibility of experimentation in one area but also depletes state resources
that could be used to experiment elsewhere. See Justice O'Connor's argument in her dissent
in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 786-87 (1982). But quite apart from the fact that, to
the extent that any inefficient regulation is bound to decrease the tax base of the state, the
same also seems to be true in the case of federal regulation of private activities, it is also true
that, so long as the federal government is prepared to back its commands with some monetary incentives, the states are free to move their previously committed financial resources
elsewhere and the federal government may acquire less control over local behavior by trying
to use the state administrative machinery for its own programs than in the case of an outright
preemption. See Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 Yale L.J.
1344, 1347 (1983).
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On closer scrutiny, however, the laboratory-of-experiment argument may turn out to prove not too much but too little. It is, of
course, quite intuitive and largely true that a locally made decision,
in the absence of countervailing factors, has a good chance of being
better adapted to local conditions. Similarly, when there are many
independent centers of decision and no countervailing factors,
chances are that this very fact may increase the probability of an
innovative solution being adopted somewhere that may then be
taken over by others. But the caveats about there being no
countervailing factors present are important. Both theoretical and
empirical studies show that Justice Brandeis's offband confidence
that the states may engage in interesting experiments "without risk
to rest of the country" 169 may be quite unfounded. There are, in
fact, a number of different considerations that have only rarely
been taken into account in assessing the laboratory-of-experiment
argument but without which its validity cannot be ascertained. The
following list is probably incomplete, but it may suffice to force a
reconsideration:
a). If, as has been argued, the states are political units that may
have their justification in history but do not necessarily correspond
to the economic and social realities of contemporary America, 170
then the forces that determine the direction of local policies may be
much less than ideally suited to foster the most efficient governmental solutions. A central government possessed of a power to
reshuffle the boundaries and powers of its territorial subdivisions
could perhaps produce much better (more efficient) local administration.
b). State regulation is often likely to have spillover effects on
other states and produce inefficient solutions by ignoring the costs
borne by outsiders. Again, a central government may tailor its
delegations of regulatory powers to jurisdictions designed to minimize such externalities. 171
c). States will often compete with one another for various resources, such as capital, which can move relatively easily to those
169

Note 165 supra.

See note 39 supra.
Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J.
of Pol. Econ. 15 2-65 (1981). The spillover effects Rose-Ackerman talks about arise when one
state adopts a policy that imposes costs on other states or creates differential costs of doing
business in different states and causes a migration of capital from one state to another.
170
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jurisdictions that offer them the most favorable conditions. As a byproduct of this rivalry, however, states may have to forgo many
redistributive and social programs that make the cost of doing business higher. 172 These programs, in addition to being otherwise
socially desirable, may also in the long run raise productivity and
contribute to better business efficiency, but no state may be able to
afford them in the short run and all will be reduced to the lowest
common denominator. 173 A central government capable of devising
national solutions can afford to be much more innovative in such
situations.
d). The costs involved in certain types of innovative regulatory
activity (such as the costs of collecting and transmitting information
or administering a program) may be too high for a local government
to bear, but economies of scale on the national level may make
regulations more cost effective. 174 Of particular importance here is
the comparative quality of state and federal officials, bureaucrats,
and administrators. The increased cost of competence, which may
be too high for a state agency, may result in much more innovative
solutions on the federal level. The lower quality of local bureaucrats may also contribute to their greater corruptibility.
e). Related to the previous point is the question of incentives that
local elective politicians may have, as compared to a professional
looking to improve his career prospects in a national bureaucratic
hierarchy. 175 While many are prepared to manifest a knee-jerk preference for a politician subject to electoral control over a "faceless
bureaucrat," the former's incentives to innovate are significantly
reduced by his desire for reelection. First, unlike a competitive
economic market, the federal system does not allow a local official
to "sell" his product (i.e., to gain additional votes) outside his jurisdiction, and this limits his incentive to innovate. Second, the fact
that beneficiaries of governmental innovation do not, as a rule,

172

Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, note 167 supra, at ll7-18.

Problems with local child-labor laws under the regime of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 25 l (1918), and the resulting clamor for a constitutional amendment, are a good
historical example of these drawbacks of local control.
173

Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, note 163 supra, at 118.
For a more complete discussion of this subject see Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalisms Promote Innovation? 9 J. Legal Stud. 593-616 (1980). The
reader may have by now observed how much the author owes to the work of Professor Susan
Rose-Ackerman.
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move from one jurisdiction to another, so as to find the one in
which the government's willingness to take risks matches their own
preferences, the politician's "portfolio" of governmental projects
will tend to cater to the risk preferences of those around the population median (rather than gravitating toward more risky innovations). Third, the possibility of free riding on the innovative solutions of other jurisdictions further reduces a politician's incentive to
take new and more risky paths. Compared to that, a career bureaucrat, looking to the approval of his superiors and the effects of his
work in a well-designed national hierarchy of administrators may
(though, of course, only may) have a system of incentives more
favorable to innovation.
f). Finally, the advantages of uniformity may often outweigh the
benefits of local innovation, even if some local solutions may have
more intrinsic merit. 176 Thus, for example, all states, except for
Louisiana, have recognized the advantages of adopting the Uniform
Commercial Code. But similar advantages to commerce could perhaps accrue from a uniformity in at least parts of tort or insurance
law. Again, a central government, not subject to local political or
constitutional constraints, could probably be much more efficient
in this respect.
The considerations just listed do not, of course, mean that the
function of the states as the laboratories of experiment is entirely
illusory. 177 They do mean, however, that the question of how to
structure the division of competences among different levels of
government to achieve the most desirable degree of innovation and
efficiency is a very complex one and that the answer to it hinges on
a variety of empirical and constantly shifting factors. It is thus quite
likely that some forms of unitary government, with a flexible system of delegation that would not be limited by constitutional provisions concerning the structure of local authorities, could accommodate much better the demands of governmental efficiency than our
own federal system. It is, of course, possible that the question of
See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, note 163 supra, 118-20.
Nor does the list given here pretend to be complete. On a more general level, for
example, it has been argued by one commentator that federalism simply delayed national
regulation of business in the United States and helped perpetuate racist acts but had no longrun impact on the character of national legislation. Riker, Federalism in 5 Handbook of
Political Science 154-56 (1975).
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governmental efficiency may have its constitutional dimensions.
The basic structure of government, which determines the nature of
the political pressures to which a government is primarily responsive, is also decisive as to whether the operations of that government will produce efficient results. But what seems doubtful is that
governmental efficiency is among the primary functions of our constitutional division of authority between the states and the federal
government. Quite to the contrary, if my analyses of the role to be
played by the states in protecting the citizens from the dangers of
governmental oppression and in providing a public space for participatory politics are correct, then the protection of these constitutional functions of the states requires that a certain price be paid for
them in terms of a degree of governmental inefficiency. To the
extent that the federal structure of government also allows for state
experimentation that may prove beneficial, this fact is, as Justice
Brandeis said, "one of the happy incidents of the federal system"
rather than its basic justification.
There is, moreover, a significant price to be paid for misjudging
the role of governmental efficiency in the process of federalismrelated constitutional adjudication. As in every complex area of
constitutional adjudication, the text of the Constitution does not by
itself unambiguously control the outcome of judicial decisions-an
interpretation of the text is always necessary to resolve the questions presented. But if the laboratory-of-experiment argument becomes a basic tool for interpreting the federalism-related provisions
of the text, the resulting harm will not be limited to the neglect of
the more important functions of the states within the federal system. First, it is unlikely that the courts could really collect all the
relevant information and make the cost-benefit analysis necessary
for striking a proper balance between the advantages of decentralization and the need for intergovernmental coordination. They will
therefore more likely resort to abstract legal rules that would ignore
the complex empirical factors involved and ultimately harm more
than help the very cause of governmental efficiency. Second, while
the political process may be far from flawless in responding to the
demands of efficiency, the legitimacy of judicial intervention is
usually at its lowest when the courts occupy themselves with primarily economic concerns. In fact, the very perception that the
Supreme Court was involved in such policy choices was a signifi-
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cant factor in the resistance to much of its federalism-related jurisprudence. 178 Third, even if the courts were able to do justice to the
complexities of the cost-benefit analysis of decentralization, it is
doubtful that considerations of this kind should be allowed to rise
to the constitutional level, for the shifting nature of most of the
factors involved makes the decisions at hand more a matter of ad
hoc managerial accommodation than one of a principled resolution
that could endure over time. To be sure, even in the process of
constitutional adjudication, the courts cannot be entirely blind to
the question of the efficiency of the policies they scrutinize. But as
in other areas of constitutional adjudication, the courts should
largely defer to legislative assessments of such matters and focus on
other, more properly judicial concerns.

V.

FUTURE 00CTRIJ\" AL DEVELOPMENTS

The outcome of my discussion is that the process-oriented
analysis of the constitutional functions of federalism, endorsed but
not really carried out in the Garcia decision, leads to a more
affirmative procedural role of the states within the federal system
than suggested on the face of Justice Blackmun's opinion. Also, two
important functions of the states-tyranny prevention and the provision of a space for participatory politics-are likely to be endangered by the national government and warrant a close judicial
scrutiny of federal interference with state and local governmental
operations. To some extent, then, my analysis confirms the accuracy of the insights implicit in National League of Cities by showing
that its insistence on the protection of the political process of local
governments, rather than on a guarantee of some exclusive state
controls over the private sector, responded to the most fundamental
desiderata of federalism, while also showing that some of these
insights need not be viewed as incompatible with the Garcia approach.
Nevertheless, developing a constitutional theory of federalism
does not automatically translate into a clear judicial doctrine specifying a set of genuinely manageable standards of review. In fact, it
is the problematic character of such standards that occupies the
bulk of the Court's opinion in Garcia and the unmanageability
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See, for example, Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States· Rights (1936).
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of the "traditional governmental functions" test laid down by
National League of Cities seems to have been one of the main reasons
for its overruling. 179 What needs to be seen is whether the theory of
federalism I have articulated can provide more reliable guidance for
judicial application.
A full-fledged elaboration of the doctrinal implications of the
process-oriented approach to federalism would probably be premature at this point. Given the collapse of National League of Cities, my
aim has been to show that the process jurisprudence endorsed in
Garcia does not signify an utter abandonment of a judicial role in
this area. Nevertheless, a few preliminary observations on doctrinal
matters may be in order.
To begin with, the delimitation of the protected processes of
state governments with reference to traditional state functions-the
road chosen by National League of Cities-is indeed deeply unsatisfactory. It is, of course, not a priori precluded that the traditional
functions of state governments are also the very ones that are the
most important from the point of view of the federalist concerns,
although it is not clear why this should be so. On closer inspection,
the traditional functions are much more likely to be a product of the
historical role of the states in regulating the private sector and they
are much more likely to have been shaped by outdated notions
of state sovereignty and more modern ideas of governmental efficiency than by the more properly constitutional concerns with tyranny prevention and political participation.
At the same time, Garcia's merciless critique of the criterion of
tradition seems to evince a desire for watertight, mechanical tests of
protected governmental functions that simply cannot be had in an
area as complex as that of federalism. Constitutional adjudication is
not, after all, a field in which simple standards predominate, and
there can be no substitute for a painful case-by-case refinement and
elaboration. Still, there are a number of ways in which the concerns
of federalism may be intelligibly used as a guide for judicial review.
First, there are some state governmental functions so directly
related to the federalist concern with preventing tyranny that they
present rather easy cases for judicial intervention (though perhaps
179 The criterion of "tradition" had been criticized by scholars prior to the Garcia case. See
Tribe, note 105 supra, at 1072-74; Kaden, note 78 supra, at 887; Alfange, Congressional
Regulation of the "States qua States": From National League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 Supreme Court Review 215, 233ff.
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they are also, at this moment, the least likely to meet with serious
interference). Under any approach, for example, federal interference with the agenda of the highest state legislative and executive
organs is likely to undermine the overall autonomy of the political
processes in the states and eliminate their constitutional role within
the federal system. Similarly, an interference with the state electoral processes, insofar as it is not clearly related to the protection of
individual rights but threatens to gerrymander the local districts in
order to change the configuration of political forces in favor of the
nationally powerful interests, would be clearly beyond the pale. A
gradual subordination of state police forces to a federal command
structure would cripple the states' ability to enforce their basic
choices and resist tyrannical pressures from above. A radical limitation of the states' ability to tax would make their fiscal solvency a
matter of federal grace and ultimately make a mockery of the
federalist concerns.
It may be a little harder to come up with equally clearly unconstitutional instances of federal interference with the states' function
of enhancing participation, especially since, as I have noted, 180 it is
mostly not the state governments themselves but rather their local
emanations that provide the primary locus of direct citizen involvement in the political life in America. Even here, though, there may
be clear enough cases. For example, given the special participatory
mode in which school boards operate in most states, a federal education law that would attempt to transform those boards into an
extension of the federal bureaucratic machinery would strike at the
very core of participatory politics in the United States. 181
Furthermore, it would be a mistake to think that cordoning off
some areas of state governments from federal interference is the
only possible method of implementing the principles of federalism.
After all, if it is not the protection of state sovereignty that is at
stake here but rather the basic functions of the states within the
federal system, it is quite likely that the nature of the central intervention itself should be more determinative of its constitutionality
than the local activity interfered with. Thus, for example, many
federal laws that depend on state governmental machinery for their
See text at notes 149-52 supra.
Even in the area of the enforcement of individual rights, where the courts have been
quite willing to interfere with local control over schools to promote racial integration, they
have stopped short of a radical transformation of the very structure of local school districting.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
180
181

FEDERALISM

8)

417

implementation attempt, though usually with only very modest
success, to assure that the states open the administrative process to
citizen involvement. 182 Insofar as such programs attempt to open
up state politics to citizen participation, without undermining those
aspects of local representative systems that may be important to
preventing tyranny, they may be subject to a looser form of control
than laws that have the opposite effect. Similarly, federal laws that
provide reimbursements for costs imposed on local governments
may be more acceptable than those that constitute a serious drain
on state fiscal resources. 183
Finally, although National League of Cities concentrated exclusively on federal interference through a system of direct commands
to local governments, federalist concerns also have some implications with respect to national action under the spending power.
The common issue that is bound to arise in both contexts, but
which was left unanalyzed by National League of Cities and its progeny, is the question of when the states are unconstitutionally induced by the national government into something that may impair
their ability to fulfill their consitutional functions. In the context of
the Commerce Clause, the question arose in FERC v. Mississippi as a
result of Justice Blackmun's intimation that if the federal government had the power to preempt the states from the field of utility
regulation, it could also condition its permission for the states to
engage in the regulation of utilities on their acceptance of federally
mandated standards and procedures. 184 The ostensible explanation
was that since the states were free to withdraw from the field
altogether, they were not coerced by the federal requirements.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in FERC disputed this approach but
gave no real criteria for distinguishing incentives from coercion. It
is this issue that becomes central when National League of Cities'
concern with the federal coercion of the states is carried over to
spending power legislation, 185 which constitutes the national government's main tool of securing state compliance with its demands. 186 The reason why federalist concerns are usually ignored
For examples of such legislation, see ACIR, Citizen Participation, ch. 4.
The Garcia Court mentioned this aspect of the federal legislation at issue there but
discounted its relevance in a footnote. 105 S.Ct. at 1020 and id. n.21.
184 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
185 The issue was specifically left open in National league of Cities, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17.
186 See ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, passim, but see esp. the table at 19-21; Kaden,
note 78 supra, at 87lff.
182
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in the judicial review of spending power legislation is primarily
related to the claim that the states are free to refuse to participate in
the federal spending programs and thus are not really coerced into
anything. 187 Nevertheless, while emphasis on the consent given by
the states to the various conditions in federal grants (often quite
unrelated to the purposes of the grant itself) 188 may comport quite
well with the idea of state sovereignty, the states' consent is often
likely to be free in a rather Pickwickian sense. 189 Even apart from
coercion, the emphasis on consent may sometimes raise serious
questions under the process analysis developed here. Even if the
states should "consent" to measures that weaken their organizational capacity to resist tyrannical pressures from the national government or their ability to protect local participatory institutions, it
is not clear that the Constitution allows the federal government
to undermine its own democratic character by proposing such
measures.
Clearly, the prospect of increased judicial control over the federal
spending power raises problems of its own, and they are beyond
the scope of this article. To recognize, however, the need for judicial concern, based in a well-thought-out theory of constitutional
interpretation, does not necessitate an overly active judicial posture. Particularly in those areas in which the determinations required to assess the validity of federal enactments cannot, for some
reason, be confidently made by the judiciary, it is always open for
the courts to assume a more deferential posture to legislative assessments but to try to assure at the same time that the legislators
themselves pay more attention to the factors that judges view as
constitutionally important. This has been done in fact by the Court
in some areas of Commerce Clause adjudication where judicial deference to a Congressional determination that a given activity concerned interstate commerce was conditioned on the Congress's explicit statement to this effect or a requirement of a series of specific
findings. 190 This kind of technique, particularly suited to Garcia's
187 This doctrine was spelled out in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Somewhat paradoxically, the Court elaborated its doctrine concerning the states' unconditional freedom at about the same time as it started to doubt to old Lochner wisdom that
regulating hours of work was an abridgement of the workers' freedom of contract.
188 See note 186 supra.
189 ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, at 39ff.; Kaden, note 78 supra, at 871ff.
190 See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (registration and
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confidence in political accountability, deserves more sustained consideration.

VI. CONCLUSION
The historical reasons why our federalist jurisprudence has
been for so long so barren of new thoughts are not very difficult to
fathom. While the Framers had been very much aware that they
were creating a new type of government, it was the sterile idea of
state sovereignty, basically more appropriate to the old Confederation than the new Union, that came to dominate the thinking about
the states. The Civil War, further shifting the balance of the federal
system, and the New Deal, which relied so heavily on building up
a national bureaucracy, made the old theories even more inadequate. At the same time, however, the best legal minds had little
incentive to shore up the jurisprudence of federalism. "Progress"
seemed to lie with centralization and chipping away at state rights;
the defense of the states seemed to have too many reactionary and
racist overtones.
It is time, however, to think again about federalism. Practically
all the barriers that federalism once posed for the efficient national
regulation of private activities have by now been swept away. One
of the positive effects of Garcia was to put to rest the old ideas of
state sovereignty. In the long run, however, unless we reassess the
meaning of our dual system of government, we may not have any
more federalism as we know it. This is not to say, of course, that
the states will cease to exist altogether, but only that if the message
of Garcia is misunderstood, the separateness of the state and national bureaucracies may be gradually undermined by ever more
complex forms of national control over the local agencies of government. The era of weak national governments is clearly behind us.
But for this very reason we should think twice before leaving behind us the era of strong local government as well. It is to be hoped
that Garcia will come to be seen not as the last word on the subject
of federalism but as the new and clean slate on which to inscribe the
future jurisprudence of state-national relations.
reporting provisions of a law prohibiting interstate shipment of gambling devices not applicable to local owners of such devices in the absence of specific congressional findings); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (l 971) (narrow reading of a federal criminal statute). lf Rewis
v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (narrow reading of the Travel Act).

